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I. INTRODUCTION 
As National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebeliui 
awaited a Supreme Court decision, some observers reflected on 
the Court-packing crisis that had roiled the nation seventy-five 
years earlier.4 In 1937 the Court had performed an apparent 
about face, upholding laws under the Commerce and the Tax 
and Spend Clauses that, in the view of most, it would have struck 
... down in 1936. According to the conventional view, Justice Owen 
Roberts had "switched in time" to preserve judicial review from 
the threat of President Roosevelt and his plan to add six new 
Justices to the Court. 
The Sebelius Court had seemed poised to strike down 
national economic legislation-in fact, a landmark federal law-
for the first time since 1937.5 And the Court came close to doing 
so. Five Justices declared that the Affordable Care Act exceeded 
1. Independent author and historian; Partner, West Wing Writers. 
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Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its financial support of my research and Amy Burchfield for 
her assistance with the manuscript. 
3. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding most 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act). 
4. E.g. Adam Liptak, Health Care Act Offers Roberts a Signature Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 11, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/us/health-care-act-offers-roberts-a-
signature-case.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O (comparing Sehelius to the 1936 cases that 
provoked the Court-packing proposal). 
5. !d. (noting a "consensus among scholars" before the decision that Chief Justice 
Roberts was "unlikely to add the fifth vote ... to uphold the law"). In fact, Chief Justice 
Roberts did provide the "fifth vote" to sustain the law under the Tax and Spend Clause. 
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Congress' powers to regulate interstate commerce. But a bare 
five to four majority upheld most of the law under the Tax and 
Spend Clause.() 
Sebelius seems likely to spur renewed attention to the 1937 
Court-packing crisis. And a longstanding scholarly controversy 
exists about what happened then. "Internalist" historians, 
according to Laura Kalman, "point to doctrinal, intellectual 
causes" for doctrinal change in the 1930's.7 "Externalist" 
historians, on the other hand, cite "political reasons," including 
the Court-packing threat and Roosevelt's landslide reelection in 
November 1936.x In philosophical terms, internalists are 
supposedly legalists who view law as autonomous from politics; 
externalists are said to be legal realists.9 
Jeff Shesol's history, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. 
the Supreme Court, does not consider the conten1porary echoes 
of 1937. But Shesol, a former Clinton White House speechwriter, 
surely recognized the parallels between then and now. Today, as 
in 1937, times are hard, the Supreme Court is conservative, and a 
Democratic President-elected on a platform of change-
advances controversiallegislation. 10 
Shesol provides a riveting, almost blow by blow account of 
the Court-packing controversy. And although he alludes to 
internalism only briefly- and not by name- Shesol seriously 
undermines the internalist view of 1937. Suprerne Power may 
mark a decisive turn in this decades old debate. 
Internalism and externalism face quite different intellectual 
challenges. The case for externalism seems straightforward. In 
1937 Justice Roberts altered his most fundamental views in three 
different areas of constitutional law-commerce, tax and spend 
and substantive due process. He did so at the precise moment 
President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court, an action that 
gravely threatened judicial review. With Roberts' switching 
sides, a five to four majority on the Court to strike down New 
6. See Sebelius. 132 S. Ct. at 2593-2602. 
7. Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE. L.J. 2165, 2166 
(1999). 
8. /d. at 2166-67. 
9. !d. at 2169. The supposed philosophical dimensions of the historical debate are 
discussed infra in Parts V. A-B. 
10. See Richard A. Posner, 1937, 2010, 241 NEW REPUBLIC 36 (Mar. 1, 2010) 
(reviewing JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010)) (comparing the Obama and Roosevelt administrations). 
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Deal legislation and state labor laws became a five to four 
majority to uphold those laws. 
What happened can be compared to a shooting. A 
previously healthy victim falls to the ground, bleeding, at the 
very moment someone fired a gun in the victim's direction. Even 
without an autopsy, the case for an external cause of the 
collapse-the gunshot-seems strong. Yet internalists have to 
argue that a cause "internal" to the victim explains the event. 
Alluding to this challenge, Barry Cushman, a leading 
internalist, acknowledges that non-political explanations of 1937 
require some "intellectual space" to appear plausible-some 
gaps between political pressure and Roberts' votes. 11 Internalists 
argue, for example, that Roberts could not have feared for the 
Court because Roosevelt's proposal was certain to fail. 12 
Internalists also claim that Roberts cast a critical vote in a 
minimum wage case before Roosevelt had proposed Court-
packing.13 In effect, they argue that Roosevelt fired blanks and, 
in any event, the victim collapsed before the gun went off. 
Two other arguments feature prominently in internalism. 
One claims that an integrated legal "fabric'' or "edifice" linked 
questions of federal power under the Constitution to questions 
about substantive due process-and that Roberts' majority 
opinion in Nebbia v. New York/ 4 a 1934 substantive due process 
decision, revealed the fabric unraveling three years before the 
Court-packing proposal. 15 On this view, Roberts changed his 
mind about one thing-the fabric-and not three different things 
(commerce, tax and spend, substantive due process). 
A related argument takes a longer view, c1t1ng 
developments in economics and social thought. G. Edward 
White, for example, argues that the "edifice of [constitutional] 
doctrine ... collapse[ d] of its own weifht" because a new "modernist 
epistemology" had undermined it. 1 This new understanding the 
world, according to White, made pre-1937 constitutional 
doctrine "incoherent. " 17 Thus, what caused the constitutional 
11. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 5 (1998). 
12. See id. at 13-17 (discussing opposition to the plan). 
13. /d. at 45. 
14. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
15. See CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 80-81. 
16. G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The 
/nternalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094,1108-09 (2005). 
17. /d. at 1109. 
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revolution predated 1937 and was not political in nature. 
Furthermore, these long-term developments made a constitu-
tional revolution inevitable. Viewed over the long-term, then, 
what an individual Justice did in a single case hardly mattered-
and Justice Roberts was not responsible for the constitutional 
revolution. 
Supreme Power largely destroys the "intellectual space" 
that internalism requires. Contrary to internalist claims, Shesol 
demonstrates that Court-packing legislation seemed likely to 
pass. Shesol also shows that when Roberts cast his supposedly 
pivotal vote on substantive due process, in December 1936, the 
entire nation was focused on the threat Roosevelt posed to the 
Court. Other writers reach similar conclusions, but none so 
convincingly or with such devastating effect as Shesol. 
Supreme Power bears on other internalist arguments 
indirectly, but in important ways. It shows, for example, that 
some brilliant contemporary observers attached little 
significance to the Nebbia decision in 1934-and that virtually no 
one considered Nebbia significant after Justice Roberts joined 
majorities in 1936 to strike down New Deal measures and 
invalidate a state minimum wage law. If contemporaries are 
capable of understanding constitutional law, this alone casts 
doubt on internalists' claims. 
Shesol also undercuts long-view internalism~ in an almost 
aesthetic way. The long view shifts attention away from singular 
events to the hypothesized deep currents of intellectual and 
economic history. Supreme Power counters with a detailed 
recreation of the legal and political world of 1937. Shesol 
conveys the sheer contingency of events brilliantly- how things 
might have turned out differently. Experiencing the world of 
1937, many readers will decide that long-view internalism simply 
misses the point. 
Part II of this review examines how Shesol's account bears 
on internalists' claims. 
Going beyond Shesol's arguments, Part III analyzes the 
internalist idea of a "fabric" of constitutional law. I argue that 
this concept is conceptually flawed and leads internalists to 
ignore or downplay facts inconsistent with their views. Indeed, 
the "fabric" idea rules out the very constitutional position that 
Justice Roberts (and n1any others) actually took in 1936-namely, 
that states should have greater latitude to regulate the economy, 
but the federal government should not. I also argue that 
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Roberts' vote to strike down a n1inimum wage law in 1936 
(rather than, as usually thought, his vote to uphold such a law in 
1937) may well have been influenced by political considera-
ions-in particular, by Roberts' aspirations for the 1936 
Republican presidential nomination. 
Part IV considers Supreme Power on its own terms. I argue 
that despite the book's overall excellence, it overlooks the 
importance of political principles and the threat Roosevelt 
actually posed to judicial review. Shesol made these mistakes, I 
suggest, because a 1997 political crisis during the Clinton 
administration influenced his understanding of the 1937 Court-
packing crisis. 
Part V argues that the very idea of an internalist-externalist 
debate, one supposedly driven by a philosophical disagreement 
about law, is mistaken. I distinguish "strong" forms of 
internalism and externalism from "weak" forms, and consider 
the different ways that legal philosophy might influence a 
historical debate. In light of that discussion, I examine the views 
of leading figures in the controversy and evaluate Shesol's 
claim-a surprising one, given the rest of his account-that it 
must be "impossible" to know what motivated Justice Roberts. 
Part VI considers how Shesol's book, along with changing 
views of judicial review and doctrinal upheavals, could affect the 
future course of historical debate. Among other possibilities, 
internalism may fracture, I argue, as some internalists adopt 
positions contrary to current internalist claims. I also examine 
how the Court itself has treated the events of 1937 -a treatment 
at odds with the very idea of an internalism versus externalism 
debate. 
II. INTERNALISM AND SUPREME POWER 
A. CHRONOLOGY AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 
Regarding the events, Supreme Power demonstrates that 
key internalist claims are mistaken- and sometimes blatantly 
wrong. 
1. December 17, 1936-President Roosevelt announced the 
Court-packing plan on February 5, 1937.1H Internalists argue that 
18. /d. at 11. 
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Justice Roberts changed his mind about the Constitution before 
then.''~ 
On December 17, 1936 the Justices conferred about West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a minimum wage case.20 Just six months 
earlier, in Moorehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 21 Roberts had 
joined four conservative Justices in an opinion that invalidated a 
state minimum wage law and endorsed a Lochner22 era view of 
substantive due process. At the Parrish conference in December, 
however, Roberts joined the Tipaldo dissenters. The result was a 
5-4 majority upholding the minimum wage law and upending 
Lochner. Since the conference predated the Court-packing 
proposal, internalists conclude that doctrine, rather than politics, 
motivated Justice Roberts. 
Shesol demonstrates, however, that Court-packing-and 
other possible severe limitations on the Court-were in the 
forefront of national discussion as the Justices conferred about 
Parrish. "By 1935," Shesol writes, 
[a]ny time an important New Deal case was pending, 
newspapers reported (based on leaks, rumors or just plain 
surmise) that Roosevelt, if displeased by the decilsion, might 
pack the Court. White House officials never denied it (p. 96). 
Worried in 1935 about the Court invalidating a measure that 
voided gold clauses in contracts-and thereby bringing about a 
financial collapse- "Roosevelt leaned, increasingly, toward 
'outright defiance"' (p. 99). In advance of the decision, he 
circulated a speech announcing that defiance "among a small 
circle of officials" (p. 99).23 After the Court upheld the gold 
clause measure, the New York Times ran excerpts from 
Roosevelt's draft-excerpts the president himself may have 
leaked (p. 105). 
Later in 1935, after the Justices invalidated! the National 
Recovery Act, the Times published a compendiurn of proposals 
to limit judicial review. Shesol summarizes them: 
There were [constitutional] amendments to permiit Congress 
to regulate wages, hours, labor conditions and industrial 
19. Kalman, supra note 7, at 2174. 
20. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); CUSHMAN, supra note 11, 
at 18. 
21. Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
23. I know of no evidence that the Justices saw the draft before deciding. However, 
it would not be surprising if they had. 
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production levels; to require at least a two-thirds vote of the 
Court's members in order to overturn a federal law; to expand 
the list of industries "affected with a public interest''; to 
mandate that the justices deliver advisory opinions on 
pending legislation; to remove social and economic policy 
from the Court's jurisdiction; and more (p. 145). 
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In September 1935, Collier's magazine reported on Roosevelt's 
views (p. 115). A "trial balloon" launched by Roosevelt himself, 
the story indicated that "the President will have no other 
alternative than to go to the country with a Constitutional 
amendment" if the Court continued striking down New Deal 
measures (p. 156). After the Court invalidated the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, on January 6, 1936, members of Congress were 
"frustrated by Roosevelt's reluctance to act against" the Court 
and produced a "cascade" of proposals, including Court-packing, 
abolishing judicial review, automatically impeaching Justices, 
and supermajority voting requirements in constitutional cases (p. 
195--96). 
Following the Tipaldo decision, commentators described 
the Supreme Court's intransigence as the most important issue 
facing the nation (p. 224). FDR, however, refrained from 
comment (p. 224). Not wanting to jeopardize his reelection, he 
said nothing about it during the 1936 reelection campaign (p. 
215). 
Immediately after the election, however, it was widely 
assumed that Roosevelt would act. "[M]any New Dealers," 
Shesol writes, "had come to view . . . [a constitutional 
an1endment limiting the Court] as a foregone conclusion" (p. 
250). On November 6, 1936 a Washington newspaper columnist 
observed that "[a ]11 . . . [the] talk about packing the Court, 
stripping it of its powers of review, tinkering with the 
Constitution, would disappear if men like Hughes and Roberts 
would relent" (p. 243). The Washington Daily News described 
the Court as "No Longer Untouchable" and, according to 
Shesol, "[ e ]ven foreign observers saw action against the 
Supreme Court as inevitable" (p. 245). 
In December, an article appeared in Colliers by a journalist 
known for his close ties to Roosevelt- an article that ended by 
observing that "Congress can enlarge the Supreme Court, 
increasing the number of Justices from nine to twelve or fifteen" 
(p. 255). Though the magazine cover date was December 26, the 
issue reached newsstands "in mid-December," Shesol writes (p. 
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255). Possibly, then, the Justices saw it before the conference in 
Parrish. 
In short, as the Justices considered Parrish the nation was 
focused on Roosevelt's probable move against the Court. The 
Justices surely knew a major threat loomed. In light of Shesol's 
account, claims that political considerations could not have 
influenced Roberts' vote in Parrish- because that vote predated 
the Court-packing plan-seem far-fetched. 
2. The Threat- A related internalist argument is that the 
Justices knew all along Congress would defeat Court-packing. 
According to Cushman, "[t]he justices had ample reason to be 
confident that constitutional capitulation was not necessary" 
because "it was doubtful that even a compromise [Court-
packing] bill could survive both a Senate filibuster and the 
House Judiciary Committee."24 Supreme Power demonstrates, 
however, that this argument is wrong as well.25 
Shesol shows that contemporaries expected Roosevelt to 
prevail. On February 6, Shesol notes, newspapers "forecast ... 
the bill's fast track to passage" (p. 305).26 And opposition leaders 
expected to lose. Senator Carter Glass said that he did not 
"imagine for a moment that [opposition] ... will do any good" 
because, in his view, Roosevelt could get "Congress to commit 
suicide" (p. 312). Senator Harry Byrd said that the Court's 
defenders would fight the President even though they could not 
"lick" the proposal (p. 324 ). The bill's opponents "were, for the 
most part, realists," Shesol concludes, who "did not expect to 
defeat the Court bill" but "sought instead to weaken, modify or 
possibly supplant it-to force the President to accept a 
compromise," which probably would involve sorne number of 
conservative Justices resigning from the bench (p. 342). On 
24. CUSHMAN, supra note11, at 25. 
25. Richard Friedman, who agrees with some of Cushman's arguments, differs on 
this point; according to Friedman "the plan, in one form or another, still had plenty of 
life" when the Court decided critical 1937 cases. Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time 
and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1972-73 (1994); see also Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed 
Lochner?, 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 1000 (2002) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000)) (observing that "[t)he President, the Senate 
majority leader, and a number of informed observers at the time could count votes ... 
and they obviously did not consider the plan a lost cause"). 
26. Believing that Roosevelt's references to "aged and infirm judges" constituted a 
major error, see discussion infra Part IV.B.l, Shesol thinks the predication of quick 
passage "already felt out of date" because there "clearly" would be a "fight" over Court-
packing (p. 306). That is a far cry, however, from claiming that the proposal was sure to 
fail. 
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February 24 Justice McReynolds' clerk wrote his parents that 
the Justice "seems to think the bill may go through" (p. 340).27 
Although opposition to the plan grew during February, 
Shesol records that the "odds" against opponents were "steadily 
lengthening" after Roosevelt's March 9 fireside chat (p. 388). In 
mid-March, Senator Hiram Johnson, a leading opponent, 
informed his son that the bill probably would pass with ease (p. 
386). Robert Jackson, then an administration official, observed 
at the end of March that "there is no question ... the President's 
plan will go through" (p. 401). As late as May-after the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had rejected the proposal, after Justice 
Van Devanter had resigned, and after the Court had upheld a 
state minimum wage law, the National Labor Relations Act and 
the Social Security Act-it remained "perfectly reasonable," 
Shesol concludes, to believe that a compromise version of the 
plan would be enacted creating fewer than six vacancies on the 
Court (p. 458-59). In July, an even more watered down com-
promise appeared possible, and an opposition leader offered to 
guarantee the resignation of two additional Justices if Roosevelt 
would abandon the proposal (p. 481). Roosevelt refused, and 
only the untimely death of Speaker Joseph Robinson-who 
would have been appointed to a Supreme Court vacancy-
doomed the President's efforts (pp. 458-60, 475-78, 481 & 493-
98).2H 
In short, Justice Roberts had every reason to fear for 
judicial review- and internalist claims to the contrary are plainly 
wrong. 
B. NEBBIA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL FABRIC 
1. A Doctrinal Fabric- If political pressure did not cause the 
change of constitutional course, what did? Leading internalists 
such as Barry Cushman and G. Edward White begin by positing 
an "interdependent web of constitutional thought" 29 (Cushman) 
or an "edifice of [constitutional] doctrine" (White) during the 
early twentieth century.30 This "web" or "edifice" encompassed a 
wide swath of constitutional law, including limitations on federal 
power and substantive due process. 
27. The clerk agreed (p. 340). 
28. These passages describe compromise proposals, Robinson's death, and 
Roosevelt's acknowledgement that he had lost. 
29. CUSHMAN, supra notell, at 6. 
30. White, supra note 16, at 1108. 
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Internalists trace what they consider a visible erosion of the 
old doctrinal edifice in pre-1937 caselaw. Like the slow collapse 
of a physical structure, doctrinal disintegration unfolded 
gradually. But the decisive event, they contend, was Justice 
Roberts' majority opinion in Nebbia, the 1934 substantive due 
process decision recognizing that a broad range of private 
transactions "affected . . . the public interest" and therefore 
should be subject to government regulation.31 Barry Cushman 
explains: 
[T]he highly integrated body of jurisprudence referred to as 
laissez-faire constitutionalism was an interwoven fabric of 
constitutional doctrine. Within that body the distinction 
between public and private enterprise performed a critical 
integrative function. When the Court abandoned the old 
public/private distinction in Nebbia, then, it pulled a 
particularly important thread from that fabric .... [and] it was 
only a matter of time before that fabric would begin to 
unravel.12 
Relying on Nebbia, internalists argue that Roberts changed 
his mind about substantive due process in 1935, and that he was 
therefore disposed to uphold minimum wage legislation in 1936 
and 1937-his 1936 vote in Tipaldo to strike down a minimum 
wage notwithstanding.33 This point is debatable, and I consider it 
below.34 If internalists are right, however, Roberts voted in 
Parrish in accord with pre-existing constitutional views; there 
was no "switch·· for political pressure to explain. 
2. The View From 1937 -Shesol does not offer detailed 
analyses of cases on a par with Cushman's or White's. Instead, 
Supreme Power briefly describes Supreme Court decisions and 
the contemporary reaction to them. In doing this, however, 
Shesol sheds important light on internalist claims about the 
"fabric," Nebbia, and doctrinal change. 
To begin with, Supreme Power demonstrates that 
knowledgeable contemporaries- including Felix Frankfurter, 
Robert Jackson and Justice Stone-did not consider Nebbia a 
major constitutional departure in 1934, and believed it 
31. See Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502,533-37 (1934). 
32. Cushman, supra note 1 L at 7 (footnotes omitted).G. Edward White accepts this 
explanation, as far it goes, and attempts to explain why the doctrinal fabric unraveled. G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 203-05 (2000). 
33. See id. at 45-4h. 
34. See discussion infra Part III.E. 
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portended little about future decisions (p. 72).3:' Others did see 
Nebbia as a constitutional turning point- but changed their 
minds over the next two years as the Court (and Justice Roberts) 
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Bituminous 
Coal Act, and a state minimum wage law. In 1937, there were 
virtually no internalists. 
Contemporaries and internalists interpret the same 
Supreme Court opinions. Yet figures such as Stone, Jackson, and 
Frankfurter did not see the doctrinal development that 
internalists do. Internalists claim that Nebbia shredded the fabric 
of constitutional law-even though no one, apparently including 
Nebbia's author, Justice Roberts-realized for three years that 
the fabric had torn. 
(a) The Decisions-On the internalist view, one would 
suspect that Nebbia had launched a series of decisions-or at 
least votes by Roberts-questioning established doctrine. The 
opposite is true, however. Nebbia was followed by decisions that 
suggested the old fabric of law not only remained intact. but that 
Roberts considered it indestructible. 
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,3" decided January 
8, 1934, preceded Nebbia. In Blaisdell, the Court rejected a 
Contracts Clause challenge and upheld a state law establishing a 
limited moratorium on mortgage foreclosures.:n Hughes wrote 
the majority opinion, which Roberts joined. The four conserva-
tive Justices dissented. 
Nebbia followed on March 5, 1934. 
Later that term, on May 6, the Court adopted a restrictive 
reading of the Commerce Clause in Railroad Retirement Board 
v. Alton Railroad Co. 3x Alton invalidated a federal law that 
required interstate carriers to provide pension and retirement 
plans for their employees; Roberts wrote the majority opinion.39 
Alton was followed on May 27, 1934 by the unanimous decision 
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, striking down the 
National Industrial Recovery Act as beyond the federal 
government's power to regulate commerce.40 On January 7, 1935, 
an 8 to 1 majority, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan invalidated 
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.(b ). 
36. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 39X (1934). 
37. /d. at 447. 
38. R.R. Ret. Bd. V. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
39. /d. at 374. 
40. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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Congress' delegation of authority to the President to regulate so-
called "hot oil"~ Cardozo alone dissented.41 
The Court never seemed more confident in established 
doctrine than during the following term. On January 6, 1936, 
United States v. Butler invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, finding the enactment beyond the federal power to tax and 
spend.42 Roberts began the majority opinion by announcing a 
broad interpretation of the Tax and Spend Clause, one 
apparently friendly to the exercise of federal power, but he 
ended by citing "the entire plan of our government" to explain 
why the federal government was powerless to pay farn1ers not to 
grow crops.43 On May 18, 1936 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 
invalidated the Bituminous Coal Act.44 The majority opinion, 
joined by Roberts, unequivocally declared rnanufacturing, 
mining and agriculture beyond the reach of the federal com-
merce power- perhaps the narrowest view of the Commerce 
Clause that the Court has ever taken.45 Then, on June 1, Tipaldo 
struck down New York's minimum wage law as a violation of 
substantive due process.411 Here, Roberts joined a majority 
opinion that explicitly reaffirmed Adkins v. New York, a 1923 
decision that embodied the Lochner approach and struck down a 
minimum wage law.47 
Carter Coal, Butler and Tipaldo did not just strike down 
legislation. Each strongly reaffirmed, even extended, existing 
restrictive doctrines and constitutional limitations. Internalists 
argue that Nebbia unraveled existing doctrine but Justice 
Roberts, the author of Nebbia, seemed to disagree .. 
Immediately after the 1936 election signs of change 
appeared at the Court. Observers noticed that "the atmosphere 
in the courtroom had changed dramatically since the election," 
Shesol writes, with conservative justices showing "less overt 
hostility" to government attorneys (p. 243). The Court also 
handed down a number of decisions sustaining social and 
economic legislation, including a state unemployn1ent insurance 
41. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
42. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
43. !d. at 74. 
44. Carter, 298 U.S. at 238. 
45. See id. at 2()8 ("As ust:d in the Constitution, the word 'commerce' is the 
equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purposes of trade,' and includes 
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of the 
different states."). 
46. Morehead v. New York ex rei Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
47. /d. at 374. 
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plan (by a divided 4-4 vote, with Roberts evidentially joining 
Hughes, Cardozo and Brandeis to uphold the plan)48 and state 
fair trade laws (unanimously) (p. 244).4<) In late December the 
Court recognized sweeping Presidential authority over foreign 
affairs (by a 7-1 vote ).50 In early January, it sustained 
(unanimously) a federal ban on the importation of prison-made 
goods into states that prohibited their sale.51 The Justices also 
unanimously upheld a federal tax on silver speculation, even 
though the tax had an obviously regulatory purpose (p. 265).52 
The Washington Daily News, for one, speculated that the Court 
might be "mend[ing] its opinions" to avoid a cataclysmic battle 
with the President (p. 265).53 
(b) What Conten1poraries Thought- Supreme Power describes 
the reaction to Supreme Court decisions as they came down. 
After the 1934 Blaisdell decision, for example, the Speaker of 
the House predicted that the Court would sustain every business 
code under the National Industrial Recovery Act-a prediction 
promptly proved wrong by Schechter (p. 70). In an even bigger 
misjudgment of Blaisdell, the New York Times guessed that the 
Court would sustain all New Deal legislation because the 
Justices had embraced Roosevelt's theory of a "living" 
Constitution (p. 70). After Nebbia, Edwin Corwin-a leading 
political scientist- opined that "[l]aissez faire . . . was in full 
retreat" and that the Court would probably uphold the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (p. 72). 
Justice Stone disagreed. He considered Nebbia "no more 
than a partial victory" because "Roberts stopped short of 
48. W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936). 
49. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). 
50. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
51. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937). 
52. United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937). 
53. William G. Ross calls these (and some other) post-election cases ''forgotten" 
decisions, noting that "many [contemporary] observers regarded them as the herald of a 
judicial transformation" William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time" Actually 
Occur?: Re-Discovering the Supreme Court's "Forgotten" Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1155 (2005). 
After demonstrating that the Court's decisions changed immediately following the 
1936 reelection-and observing that the new decisions would blunt Roosevelt's move 
against the Court-Ross concludes that the "forgotten" decisions somehow weaken the 
case for a politically motivated "switch." !d. at 1157. Among other things, Ross accepts 
internalist claims that the Court-packing proposal "was widely regarded as doomed[.]" 
!d. at 1219. At times, however, Ross acknowledges the obvious, at one point writing: 
The election of 1936, therefore, may have provided the occasion for a judicial 
revolution, even if it was not the cause. Or, to the extent that it was the 
immediate cause, it was not the sole cause. 
!d. at 1211-12. 
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creating sweeping new doctrine" and had left "a path for a 
possible retreat" through "case-by-case" review (p. 72).54 He also 
characterized Roberts' approach in Nebbia as "not ... novel" (p. 
125). Shesol's own judgment is that Blaisdell and Nebbia "gave 
states more room to regulate" but "offered no indication of the 
Court's next move" (p. 218-19).55 
Post-Nebbia cases made a strong impression on con-
temporaries. To many observers, Alton indicated that Roberts 
had joined the conservative Justices once and for all (p. 125). 
Shesol notes that the opinion "reject[ ed] the very idea of a 
relationship between retirement security and interstate 
commerce" (p. 118). 
Schechter came next. Frankfurter had urged Roosevelt not 
to take the case to the Supreme Court because the "fundamental 
situation" on the Court had "not changed" (p. 132). Despite 
Nebbia, then, Frankfurter expected the Court to strike down the 
law- as it did, unanimously. Indeed, immediately after the Court 
announced its decision, Justice Brandeis pointedly told two 
administration aides that the day's opinions56 had ''change[ d] 
everything'' (p. 136). "The President ... has been living in a 
fool's paradise," Brandeis said. "I want you to go back and tell 
the President that we're not going to let this government 
centralize everything," he added, "[i]t's come to an end'' (p. 37). 
His remarks suggest that the Court was drawing a constitutional 
line in the sand around old constitutional doctrine -after 
Nebbia. 
In 1935, Robert Jackson said the Court had discarded the 
fundamental idea that '·it is an awesome thing" to invalidate a 
democratically enacted law; Nebbia, decided the year before, 
apparently did not alter that conclusion (p. 171 ). In 1937, 
Roosevelt, Frankfurter and leading Justice Department 
attorneys all expected the Court to strike down the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and the Social Security Act (p. 243). 
54. The quoted language is Shesol's, not Justice Stone's. 
55. At another point, Shesol described Nehhia as "more a reaffirmation than a 
doctrinal revolution" but added that "Robert's abandonment of the restrictive 'public 
interest' test ... was momentous" (p. 71 ). 
56. On the same day, the Court also handed down a decision that limited the 
President's power to discharge executive officials, Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602 (1935), and one that struck down a federal mortgage moratorium measure, 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). (p. 134) Humphrey's 
Executor especially angered Roosevelt, who thought the Justices had decided against him 
out of spite (p. 143 ). 
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Shesol cites no one who regarded Nebbia as portending much of 
anything after Butler, Carter Coal and Tipaldo. 
The reaction to Carter Coal and Butler generally followed 
political lines. Tipaldo, however, produced a "wave of national 
revulsion" across the board (p. 222). Shesol reports that 334 out 
of 344 newspaper editorials condemned the decision; even some 
conservative newspapers contemplated a constitutional amend-
ment to sanction anti-sweatshop legislation (p. 222). At the 
Republican convention that summer, the delegates split over 
Tipaldo (p. 226). But the nominee, Alf Landon, announced that 
Republicans would seek a constitutional amendment should the 
Court strike down other minimum wage laws (pp. 228-29). 
Earlier, there had been a move to nominate Justice Roberts as 
the Republican candidate, but that possibility vanished because 
he joined the Tipaldo majority (p. 231 ). 
According to Shesol, "[r]arely had judges in the majority 
felt so embattled and misunderstood" (p. 230). Because of 
Roberts' well known desire for approval-and perhaps also 
because of the demise of his presidential hopes-Shesol suggests 
that Roberts may have been affected most of all (p. 231).57 In any 
event, that summer he and Hughes had an intense, hours-long 
discussion-it is not known about what-at Roberts's estate (p. 
232-33). 
Reaction to the "switch in time" opinions was almost as 
uniform as the reaction to Tipaldo. Felix Frankfurter, who later 
became a proponent of internalism, described Roberts' 
"somersault" in Parrish as "a shameless, political response to the 
present now" (p. 412). Writing to Roosevelt, Frankfurter 
remarked that "with the shift by Roberts [on the minimum 
wage], even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in 
politics" (p. 412). After the Court upheld the National Labor 
Relations Act, Frankfurter telegraphed Roosevelt and said that 
he felt "like finding some honest profession to enter" (pp. 434-
35). When the Court sustained the Social Security Act, 
Frankfurter deplored "the political somersaults (for such they 
are) of the Chief and Roberts" (p. 455). 
57. Roberts said later that he "never had the notion" of being a Presidential 
candidate (p. 231 ). Shesol notes, however, that Roberts never publically discouraged 
efforts to secure him the nomination (p. 231 ). She sol also quotes a later remark by 
Roberts: 
However strong a man's mentality and character, if he has this ambition in his 
mind it may tinge or color what he does (p. 231 ). 
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Frankfurter was not alone. Asked by Attorney General 
Cummings how Roberts could vote to strike down the minimum 
wage in Tipaldo and to uphold it in Parrish, Justice "Stone said 
he had not the remotest idea ... he could not understand it" (p. 
427). Senator -later, Justice- Sherman Minton asserted that 
Roberts had changed his vote only because "the chief justice was 
talking politics to him. There is no other explanation" (p. 484). 
Remarkably, the Parrish dissent (which Shesol quotes) took a 
similar view (p. 408). In an obvious allusion to Roberts, the 
dissenters wrote: 
Undoubtedly it is the duty of a member of the court, in the 
process of reaching a right conclusion, to give due weight to 
the opposing views of his associates; but in the end, the 
question which he must answer is not whether such views 
seem sound to those who entertain them, but whether they 
convince him that the statute is constitutional or engender in 
his mind a rational doubt upon that issue. The oath which he 
takes as a judge is not a composite oath, but an individual 
one. And in passing upon the validity of a statute, he 
discharges a duty imposed upon him, which cannot be 
consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the views 
of others which have neither convinced, nor created a 
reasonable doubt in, his mind. If upon a question so 
important he thus surrender his deliberate judgment, he 
stands forsworn. He cannot subordinate his convictions to 
that extent and keep faith with his oath or retain his judicial 
and moral independence.5s 
Like the liberals Stone, Frankfurter, and Jackson, conservative 
Justices did not understand Roberts' change of mind in doctrinal 
terms. 
The phrase "switch in time that saved the nine" appeared in 
connection with the Court's next constitutional turnabout. A 
year after Carter Coal had declared manufacturing beyond the 
reach of the Commerce Clause, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. 59 sustained federal labor regulations in manufacturing 
plants and upheld the National Labor Relations Act. The 
"switch in time" idea "caught on," Shesol explains, "because it 
captured what virtually everyone on both sides of the fight 
believed: that the Supreme Court, seeking to save itself from 
being packed, had simply surrendered" (p. 434). Even the "most 
implacable" opponents of Court-packing, Shesoll notes, under-
58. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-02 (1937). 
59. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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stood Jones & Laughlin in this way (p. 434). Hiram Johnson, for 
example, observed that 
This would not have happened three months ago before the 
agitation about the Supreme Court ... I think they . [Hughes 
and Roberts] voted right this time, but . . . [i]n my opinion 
they permitted themselves to be bludgeoned into voting to 
sustain the Act. I don't think the Court, from the standpoint 
of its personnel, at least a portion of it, is worth fighting for, 
and if it were not for the immensely bigger thing at stake, I 
would not be engaged in this contest (p. 434 ).60 
Thus, almost no one in 1937 thought that doctrine explained 
Roberts' votes-not Justice Stone, not Administration lawyers, 
not Felix Frankfurter, not newspapers or commentators, and not 
the dissenters in Parrish. And how can internalism be right 
about the law today, if those who understood constitutional 
doctrine best in 1937 thought it was wrong? 
C. THE VIEW FROM AFAR 
Another argumentative strand in internalism sees long term 
historical forces behind the constitutional revolution of the 
1930's. G. Edward White, for example, considers it 
"fundamentally, an interpretive revolution,"1" in which a 
"modernist epistemology" that had emerged during the early 
twentieth century caught up with the law.()2 Until the 1930's, 
according to White, the Court had utilized "guardian review,"n3 
based on the idea that "preordained boundaries" existed 
"between public power and private rights and between the 
nation and the states."64 Constitutional law "guarded" these 
boundaries. In the 1930's, however, guardian review collapsed: 
[O]ver the first three decades of the twentieth century, there 
had been a sea change in attitudes toward the role of the 
judge in constitutional interpretation. That attitudinal change 
was connected to a larger epistemological shift. As the 
defining features of modernity-mature industrial capitalism, 
60. A few days after the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the Court-packing 
proposal, the Supreme Court upheld the Social Security Act in opinions that, according 
to Shesol, "took an even more expansive view of the federal taxing and spending power 
and the general welfare clause than the most optimistic government attorneys had 
thought possible" (pp. 453-54). The "New Deal's victory was complete," observed the 
Washington Post (p. 454). 
61. WHITE, supra note 32, at 234. 
62. White, supra note 16, at 1109-10. 
63. !d. at 233. 
64. /d. 
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a broadened base of political participation, the collapse of 
rigid status distinctions, and the secularization of higher 
learning brought about by the growing influence of scientific 
methods of inquiry as techniques for acquiring and using 
knowledge- transformed the experience of Americans in the· 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new theories of 
causal attribution became influential. . . . Modernist 
epistemology was premised on the belief that humans, by 
using techniques of scientific inquiry, could intervene to affect 
their destiny and help shape their future. 65 
The result of these larger developments, in White's view, 
"was a constitutional revolution, one in which Supreme Court 
justices ... concluded that there was no intelligible distinction 
between the authority of legal sources [such as the Constitution] 
and that of their designated interpreters [the judges them-
selves]."66 In this way, "[t]he shock waves of modernity" pro-
duced "widespread ... acceptance of the proposition that judges 
made law in constitutional interpretations as well as in common 
law decisions. "07 By undermining the strict separation between 
judging and lawmaking, the new epistemology brought an end to 
"guardian review."ox 
Supreme Power does not directly address such arguments. 
But it manages to undercut them. Accounts like White's make 
day-to-day events seem like flotsam carried along on deep 
historical currents. Shesol, on the other hand, recreates the 
world of the mid-1930's in detail. Doing so., he describes 
numerous events, even petty personal slights, that could have 
changed the outcome. What results is a sense of contingency that 
holds readers in suspense even though they know what happens. 
By contrast, the long view encompasses things that most readers 
will have never heard of, but involves no suspense at all. Readers 
of Supreme Power see what the long view obscures-and few 
will conclude that the world Shesol recreates did not really 
matter. 
If deep historical currents determined events~, it would make 
no difference had Roberts said, "I'm going to violate my oath to 
save the Court from Franklin Roosevelt." Historical currents, 
which Roberts could not alter, would remain controlling. Did 
politics influence Roberts? On the long view, the question 
65. White, supra note 16, at 1109. 
66. WHITE, supra note 32, at 233. 
67. /d. at 235. 
68. !d. 
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approaches insignificance: what had to happen would have 
happened no matter what Roberts did. 
Yet the answers actually matter a great deal. If Roberts had 
not "switched" in 1937, the Court probably would have been 
packed. Opponents rightly feared for judicial review if that 
occurred. Modernist epistemology could have triumphed-
assume White is correct about that- but at the cost of judicial 
review. Nor did modernist epistemology mandate Brown v. 
Board of Education, Reynolds v. Sims, or Roe v. Wade, decisions 
that a weak Court would not have handed down and certainly 
could not have enforced. 
Indeed, a plausible corollary of modernist epistemology is 
that judicial review should end. The classic defense of judicial 
review rests on a distinction between judging and lawmaking-
the very distinction modern epistemology eliminates, according 
to White. Even if modern epistemology was predestined to 
triumph, then, judicial review was not predestined to survive-
and Justice Roberts' switch quite possibly saved it. 
III. AN UNRAVELING FABRIC-AND PARRISH 
The concept of a constitutional fabric-which is critical to 
internalism- has other problems, besides those suggested by 
Supreme Power. 
First, although internalism supposedly takes legal doctrines 
seriously, the "fabric" idea licenses internalists to ignore pivotal 
decisions (other than Nebbia ). Second, the "integrated fabric" 
posits an unbreakable doctrinal link between substantive due 
process and constitutional limits on federal power. Yet nothing 
in the Constitution connects the two. Moreover, evidence 
suggests that if Roberts wanted to weaken substantive due 
process constraints before 1937, he also wanted to strengthen 
constitutional restraints on the national government-a com-
bination of positions that "fabric" theory deems impossible. 
Third, internalists disregard earlier and later decisions demon-
strating that the "fabric," if it exists at all, is actually two sided-
and that judges can choose which one to show. 
A. IGNORING DOCTRINE: BUTLER AND CARTER COAL 
Internalists attach enormous weight to Justice Roberts' 
words in Nebbia, not just to the case result. But their interest in 
doctrinal language is selective. For internalists, language in 
contemporaneous commerce and tax and spend cases seemingly 
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does not count in the same way. In practice, internalists take 
judicial language seriously only when doing so comports with the 
hypothesized "fabric" of law. 
Consider Butler, the decision that struck down the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. The opinion of the Court, which 
Roberts wrote, began by endorsing a broad reading of the words 
"general welfare" in the Tax and Spend Clause-an 
endorsement internalists surely would have deemed highly 
significant if Roberts had not immediately proceeded to 
invalidate the law as an unconstitutional encroachment on "the 
reserved rights of the states. "69 The Act aimed "to regulate and 
control agricultural production," that being "an unconstitutional 
end," according to Roberts, "beyond the powers delegated to 
the federal government. "70 
But if Roberts' broad understanding of "general welfare" in 
Butler means little for his views about federal power, why should 
his declaration that "all businesses are affected with the public 
interest" in Nebbia say everything about his understanding, not 
only of substantive due process, but of federal power, the 
Commerce Clause, and the Court's role? Making matters worse 
(for internalists), in Butler Roberts cited Adkins v. Children's 
Hospitafl-the 1923 decision striking down a minimum wage law 
that the Court would reaffirm in Tipaldo- and implied that he 
shared Adkins' understanding of the Court's role in 
constitutional adjudication.72 
Or consider Carter Coal. Roberts joined an opinion of the 
Court that categorically barred the federal governtnent from 
regulating manufacturing, agriculture and mining- a result 
anticipated by Butler and described in Carter Coal as 
"fundamental ... [and] essential to the maintenance of our 
constitutional system."73 Yet in Jones & Laughlin, a year later, 
Roberts and Court sustained a federal regulation of labor 
relations in manufacturing.74 Why does the language in Carter 
Coal count for Jess than language in Nebbia? 
69. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). 
70. /d. 
71. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
72. Butler, 297 U.S. at 63 n.9. Justice Roberts' footnote begins with the "Compare'' 
signal, and cites to a page where the Adkins describes a role for the Court in 
constitutional matters very like the one Roberts invokes in Butler. ld.; see also Adkins, 
261 U.S. at 544. 
73. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936) (distinguishing between 
direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce). 
74. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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B. A COAT OF MANY COLORS 
For internalists, the answer is an integrated fabric of 
constitutional law. Using this non-doctrinal construct, 
internalists privilege judicial statements that comport with their 
view, while ignoring or downplaying the more numerous 
statements that do not. The "integrated fabric" of internalists is 
a coat of many colors: it lets you see what you please. 
Nothing in the fabric concept counterbalances its apparent 
arbitrariness. Because of the fabric, when Roberts changed his 
mind about substantive due process in Nebbia in 1934, he 
supposedly changed his mind about limits on federal power, too. 
But if the two areas of law are truly linked, then Butler and 
Carter Coal-commerce and tax and spend cases-also indicate 
a strengthening of Justice Roberts' attachment to Lochner-era 
substantive due process doctrines in 1936. But internalists do not 
draw that conclusion. Instead, they assume that the old 
constitutional fabric could only weaken during the 1930's, never 
strengthen. To assume that, however, is to simply assume that 
internalism must be correct. 
There is a closely related possibility, involving a "long view" 
conception of history. Constitutional law obviously changed 
between 1932 and 1937, and one might plausibly assume that 
gradual processes were at work. Knowing the outcome, as later 
historians do, one might distinguish decisions that moved 
constitutional law toward its ultimate destination from decisions 
that did not. Only the former-Nebbia, for example-would be 
said to reflect operative historical currents. 
This variant of internalism is not Justice-centered. It might 
even accept the possibility that Justice Roberts was embracing 
the old constitutional edifice in Carter Coal and Butler. His 
doing so would not matter, however: sooner or later, historical 
currents would have to carry constitutional law to its historic 
destination. 
This view is extraordinarily problematic. It wrongly assumes 
that processes of legal change must be gradual and continuous 
rather than abrupt-an assumption that itself virtually rules out 
a political switch by Roberts. It also wrongly assumes that 
constitutional doctrine had to end up where it eventually did. It 
hardly was inevitable, after all, that Justice Roberts would 
change his mind; the four conservative Justices never did. Again, 
President Roosevelt might have died in 1937 rather than in 
1944-surely nothing in the constitutional fabric had a bearing 
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on his life expectancy- and a more conservative successor could 
have appointed conservative Justices upon becoming President. 
C. A TORN FABRIC: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND 
FEDERAL POWER 
For internalists, Roberts could not have combined a 
stringent view of the constitutional limits on federal power with 
a relaxed view of substantive due process. The fabric precluded 
it. Judging by his actions and words, however-and accepting an 
internalist-like reading of Nebbia-during the mid-1930's Roberts 
did exactly that. Roberts authored Nebbia in 1934. But he 
endorsed narrow interpretations of the Commerce Clause the 
next year, in Alton and Schechter. The following term Roberts 
joined the Carter Coal opinion, with its categorical rule against 
federal regulation of manufacturing. And Roberts' own opinion 
in Butler recognized an impregnable zone of reserved state 
power that the national government could never invade.75 
Apart from the fabric idea, nothing in this cornbination of 
positions seems problematic. The parallel political view-one 
that favored economic intervention by states and severe limits on 
federal economic regulation- had wide support. That is why 
Tipaldo produced far more public opposition than Carter Coal. 
Many feared that a powerful federal government would become 
a dictatorship. The distinction between state and national power 
relates to the Constitution, not the economy-yet internalists, 
ironically, slight the possibility that constitutional views could 
override general views about economic regulation. 
In short, the theory of the "fabric" is belied by Roberts'-
and others' -actual views. 
D. THE FABRIC IN PERSPECTIVE 
Internalists argue that during the mid-1930's one 
constitutional structure was in the process of succeeding another. 
G. Edward White explicitly portrays these structures as 
offshoots of larger societal and cultural develop1nents- and, in 
particular, of a new, "modernist" way of understanding the 
world. 76 But whether explicit or not, internalist arguments 
generally suppose that more than constitutional doctrine was 
involved. For White, how judges thought about law was 
75. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-78 (1936). 
76. See White, supra note 16, at 1108-10. 
2013] BOOK REVIEWS 473 
transfonned --a process so deep that it lay beyond the control of 
individual jurists.77 
Lending plausibility to these claims are the obvious, 
persistent patterns in constitutional law over the past four 
decades. Judges with an expansive view of federal power under 
the Commerce Clause, for example, generally also take an 
expansive view of non-economic, substantive due process rights. 
On the other side, judges concerned about the position of states 
in the federal system generally take a less expansive view of non-
economic substantive due process rights-if they recognize any 
substantive due process rights at all. The constitutional text does 
not account for these patterns, and it makes sense to suppose 
that deeper, extra-constitutional concepts-perhaps embedded 
in webs, edifices, or structures-might do so. 
These clusters of competing constitutional views co-exist at 
the same time, however. They may explain or illuminate patterns 
of doctrinal division. But it would be implausible to believe that 
a conceptual dynamic internal to the structures- or a deep 
historical dynamic outside of them-determines which cluster of 
competing views will prevail. Even if fundamentally opposed 
structures of constitutional law existed in the 1930's, then, 
neither one had to triumph. 
Internalists argue that a new constitutional structure 
became necessary to deal with modern economic, social and 
cultural life. 7~ Strikingly, Roosevelt believed the same thing-
that a "living constitution" was needed to accommodate the 
modern world (p. 517-18). Seen in this light, internalism takes 
Roosevelt's view of the living Constitution and turns it into 
historical dogma. But Roosevelt's position was disputed in the 
1930's, both for legal reasons (the Constitution doesn't change 
with the times) and economic ones (New Deal programs won't 
work). It remains disputed today. Nor do these views become 
less controvertible as historical claims by internalists than as 
political and legal arguments. 
Suppose, for example, that political conservatives win the 
next three presidential elections, and appoint "conservative" 
Justices. These Justices, in turn, invigorate Commerce Clause 
restrictions on the federal government and eliminate substantive 
due process rights, such as the right to abortion. How convincing 
would a G. Edward White-like analysis be-one that argued 
77. !d. at 1110. 
78. !d. at llOR. 
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deep cultural changes altered how judges thought about the 
Constitution and thereby made doctrinal shifts inevitable? 
Current patterns in constitutional law undercut 
internalism-or at least G. Edward White's version-in another 
way. White argues that modernist epistemology led Justices to 
abandon the idea of policing of sharply defined constitutional 
boundaries, a practice he calls "guardian review."79 In fact, 
however, the Justices never stopped policing constitutional 
boundaries; they merely changed the constitutional boundaries 
that they policed. All but abandoning the boundary line 
surrounding federal authority, the Court moved to the boundary 
between government authority (in non-economic matters) and 
individuals' rights. But as "guardian review" shifted from the 
Commerce Clause to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Court's conceptual toolbox remained the 
same. 
Even in the area of the Commerce Clause, Sebelius shows 
that the old tools remain viable. Not only did a n1ajority in that 
case find the Affordable Care Act outside the commerce power, 
but four Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito-seemed 
to call for something like guardian review in Commerce Clause 
cases. The Constitution's "[s]tructural protections-notably the 
restraints imposed by federalism and separation of powers" 
might seem "less romantic," they wrote, "than the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights or the Civil War An1endments."110 But those 
protections, including federalism restraints, were in fact the 
"most important" constitutional protections of freedom and, for 
that reason, "were embodied in the original Constitution and not 
left to later amendment. ,RJ That suggests the possibility of the 
same type of review in Commerce Clause and Bill of Rights 
cases-without any sign of an antecedent epistemological 
revolution. 
The specifics of White's argument aside, no deeper-than-
doctrine changes in constitutional thinking seem to have 
occurred during the mid-1930's. The Justices knew how to be 
deferential before 1937, in both federalism and substantive due 
process cases-when they wanted to be. Hammer v. Dagenhart-
the 1918 case that struck down a federal ban on the shipment of 
79. WHITE, supra note 32, at 4. 
80. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting). 
81. /d. at 2676-77. 
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products made by child labor- seemed remarkable precisely 
because in earlier cases the Court had interpreted the 
Commerce Clause to empower Congress to ban all manner of 
products and persons crossing state lines. H2 Hammer suggested 
that the Justices' level of deference would vary depending on 
their policy preferences.~>3 More remarkabJy, a few days before 
deciding Lochner in 1905, the Court upheld a mandatory 
vaccination statute against a substantive due process challenge in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 84 Handed down thirty years before 
Nebbia, Jacobson was an extraordinarily deferential substantive 
due process decision, with the Court suggesting that whether 
vaccination actually worked was constitutionally irrelevant; it 
was enough, it seemed, if the legislature thought it worked.85 
In sum, a doctrinal revolution surely occurred during the 
1930's. But it involved no obvious signs of a deeper revolution in 
thought. Nor would competing constitutional fabrics during the 
1930's-assuming they existed-preclude a political explanation 
of the constitutional revolution. 
E. TIPALDO AND PARRISH 
The question why Roberts joined the majority in Tipaldo-
and then, less than a year later, voted to uphold minimum wage 
legislation in Parrish -looms large for internalists. It is 
sometimes treated as the decisive question in the entire 
internalist-externalist debate. 
Felix Frankfurter took this approach in an influential 1955 
memorial tribute to Roberts.86 There, Frankfurter revealed that 
Roberts, after retiring, wrote a memorandum explaining his 
votes in Tipaldo and Parrish.87 According to this memorandum, 
the challengers in Tipaldo never asked the Court to overrule 
Adkins (the 1923 decision striking down a minimum wage), but 
82. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
83. See id. at 275 ("That there should be limitations upon the right to employ 
children in mines and factories in the interest of their won and the public welfare, all will 
admit."). 
84. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 ( 1905). 
85. /d. at 36 (rejecting any suggestion that the Court should "go over the whole 
ground gone over by the legislature"). Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner cited 
Jacobson immediately after noting that "[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. 
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
86. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955 ). 
87. /d. at 314. 
476 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:451 
instead tried to distinguish Adkins.xx Roberts, however, found 
Tipaldo indistinguishable fron1 Adkins and-Adkins being 
unchallenged- voted to strike down the law in Tipaldo.x<J In 
Parrish, on the other hand, the Court was asked to overrule 
Adkins, Roberts wrote.'!() And with that question before the 
Court, Roberts agreed Adkins should be overruled.'!] On this 
account, no "switch" whatever occurred between Tipaldo and 
Parrish. 
Modern internalists and externalists both see the problem 
with Roberts' explanation: in fact, no litigant in Parrish had 
asked the Court to overrule Adkins.l)2 Roberts misrernembered. 
Fron1 their common starting point, however, externalists and 
internalists proceed in opposite directions. Indeed, what a writer 
says about Roberts' votes in the two cases provides an excellent 
indication of where that writer stands on the internalist-
externalist continuum. 
Michael Ariens is an externalist. He believes that Roberts 
was poised to strike down the statute in Parrish, just as he did in 
Tipaldo; politics changed Roberts' vote, in Ariens'' view.l)3 
lnternalists, by contrast, hold that Roberts' JVebbia opinion 
ret1ected his modern view of substantive due process. Since 
minimum wage laws are easily constitutional on that view, 
Roberts' Tipaldo vote constitutes the anomaly demanding an 
explanation- not his vote in Parrish. Richard Friedman argues, 
for example, that Parrish was "really a corollary of Nebbia. "<)4 
Friedman notes that the Tipaldo majority opinion highlighted 
the absence of any request to overrule Adkins, and concludes 
that language was necessary to keep Roberts'' vote.9-" Thus, 
Friedman credits Roberts' explanation of his Tipaldo vote, even 
though he rejects Roberts' attempt to distinguish Tipaldo and 
Parrish.90 For Friedman, in Parrish Roberts changed his mind 
only about whether to reach the question of overruling Adkins.47 
RR /d. 
R9. /d. at 314-15. 
90. /d.at315. 
91. /d. 
92. See discussion infra this Part. 
93. Michael Aricns, A Thrice- Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 
641 (1994). 
94. Friedman, supra note25, at 1938. 
95. /d.at1941. 
90. /d. at 1942. 
07. /d. at 1951-52. 
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Friedman offers two interesting theories to explain why 
Roberts would do so. Recalling the wide public condemnation of 
Tipaldo, he suggests that it was "[t]he [public] reaction to 
Tipaldo itself, rather than ... the election of 1936 or ... the 
Court-packing battle of 1937" that prompted Roberts to reach 
the issue in Parrish. <Jx Friedman prefaced this analysis, however, 
by observing that no "political explanation" might be required at 
all.'!<) "The 'beginning of wisdorn' in attempting to understand 
Roberts," he wrote 
is to avoid the assumption that, absent political pressure, he 
would act in a way that most observers would regard as 
consistent. He surprised even his colleagues and perhaps even 
himself, and followed his own strange, sometimes 
unfathomable light. 100 
Barry Cushman, a strong internalist, notes Friedman's 
"speculat[ion ]" that a "public outcry following the Tipaldo 
decision might have prompted Roberts to face squarely the 
question of Adkins' continued vitality." 101 Cushman, however, 
offers a more legal account. "It may have been," he writes, 
Roberts thought that striking down a minimum wage statue 
on such a narrow, technical ground twice in less than one year 
was simply taking the niceties of appellate procedure too 
seriously, especially when the effect was to reaffirm a-
d h h d k . . 102 prece ent e a no sta e m preservmg. 
Thus, where Friedman saw public opinion influencing Roberts-
albeit not the opinion expressed in the 1936 election- Cushman 
saw Roberts ruminating about how far to take the "niceties of 
appellate procedure." Cushman is the more thoroughgoing 
internalist. 
According to Friedman and Cushman-and to Roberts 
himself-in Tipaldo he would have voted to overrule Adkins had 
he reached that question. Yet the Tipaldo opinion, which 
Roberts joined, reconsidered and reaffirmed Adkins. 103 How can 
that square with the claim that Roberts had joined the majority 
98. /d. at 1952. 
99. /d. Friedman also suggested that Roberts' "mercurial nature may be a sufficient 
explanation of his conduct." /d. at 1896. 
100. !d. at 1953 (internal references omitted). 
101. CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 97. Cushman also observes that "[b]y 1937, the 
prohibition against minimum wage legislation was about all that was left nf economic 
substantive due process." !d. at 105. 
102. /d. at 97. 
103. Morehead v. New York ex re/Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587,601-03 (1936). 
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in Tipaldo because the viability of Adkins was not before the 
Court? 
In his memorandum, Roberts explained that Justice Butler's 
initial draft of the Tipaldo opinion had not endorsed Adkins. 104 
Butler added that only after a draft dissent circulated attacking 
the earlier case. 105 "My proper course," Roberts continued, 
would have been to concur specially ... [on the ground that 
Adkins' validity was not before the Court]. I did not do so. 
But at conference ... I said that I did not propose to ... 
reexamine the Adkins case until a case should come to the 
Court requiring that this should be done. 106 
However, Roberts did not explain his failure "to concur 
specially." 
Tipaldo was handed down at the end of term, and Cushman 
suggests Roberts perhaps lacked the "energy" and "inclination" 
to extend what was already "the most fractious and exhausting 
term of Hughes' tenure."107 More generally, Friedtnan notes that 
"Roberts did his best not to stick out," never wrote a concurring 
opinion, and only twice "silently concur[red]" (neither joining 
the majority opinion nor writing his own) during Hughes' entire 
tenure as Chief J ustice. 10~ 
Thus, Frankfurter, Friedman, and Cushman all conclude 
that neither election results nor the Court--packing plan 
influenced Roberts. Yet they reach this conclusion for utterly 
different, and sometimes inconsistent, reasons. Frankfurter 
believes that Tipaldo and Parrish were different procedurally; 
Friedman and Cushman do not. Frankfurter declared that 
Roberts' "character" made it inconceivable- in fact, 
"ludicrous"- to think that politics had influenced the Justice. 109 
But Friedman thinks Roberts was "mercurial" and 
"unfathomable'' and quite possibly was influenced by the public 
reaction to Tipaldo. For his part, Cushman saw no need to 
consider Roberts' character at all, only his legal attitude toward 
procedural niceties. Thus Roberts was steadfast, or he was 
mercurial, or his character made no difference; the conclusion 
104. Frankfurter, supra note R6, at 314. 
105. /d. at 315. 
106. !d. (reproducing Roberts' memorandum). 
107. CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 103. 
108. Friedman, supra note 25. at 1945; but see CUSHMAN. supra note 11, at 263 n.58 
(questioning Friedman's characterization of Roberts). 
109. Frankfurter, supra note X6. at 313. 
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remains the same for internalists- he did not "switch" in 
Parrish. 
There is another possibility, however. In the running for the 
1936 Republican presidential nomination, Roberts might have 
preferred to take no position in Tipaldo on an issue like the 
minimum wage-an issue that, as noted earlier, would divide 
delegates to the 1936 Republican convention. 110 Once the 
Tipaldo majority had endorsed Adkins, however, it became 
difficult for Roberts to remain neutral. Doing so would open a 
visible split between him and the four conservative Justices-
exactly what Roberts might have wished to avoid. And with 
seven Justices now addressing the Adkins issue-Hughes alone 
did not, since he found Tipaldo distinguishable- it would have 
seemed odd for Roberts to avoid the question. In short, Roberts 
preferred that the Court take no stand on Adkins before the 
election. But when the other Justices did so, Roberts may have 
voted mindfully to uphold Adkins. And if that happened, politics 
in fact swayed Roberts' vote in a minimum wage case. But it was 
his Tipaldo vote-with Roberts perhaps misjudging the effects 
on his chances for the nomination-and not his vote in Parrish. 
IV. SUPREME POWER 
A. PRINCIPLES 
Contemporaries viewed the Court-packing controversy as a 
historic battle, pitting individuals against principles or funda-
mental political forces. Roosevelt and his supporters thought 
that conservative Supreme Court Justices were at war with 
modern times and with proper constitutional principles. 
Opponents of the plan saw a president undermining judicial 
independence, perhaps as part of a design to become a dictator. 
Shesol's subtitle, "Franklin Roosevelt versus the Supreme 
Court," subtly departs from this model. It posits an individual, 
Roosevelt, in a struggle. But Roosevelt's adversary was an 
institution, the Court, and not a political principle or historic 
force. Moreover, neither Roosevelt nor the Court gets portrayed 
as a villain in Supreme Power. In fact, no large political 
principles or forces operate at all in Shesol's book-nothing a 
hero could defend or a villain endanger. Principles that 
contemporaries saw in play-judicial independence, liberty, 
110. See discussion supra Part II.B.2(b ). 
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democratic governance, economic justice-get mentioned as 
Shesol recounts what was said. But Supreme Power treats them 
only as words. He assesses their political impact, but ignores how 
Court-packing might actually have affected liberty, democracy 
or justice. 
Shesol's treatment of Court-packing opponents reflects this 
approach. He attributes their opposition to narrow political 
calculations or petty grievances against Roosevelt. Senator 
Bertram Wheeler, for example, was a Montana progressive who 
led congressional opposition to Court-packing (p. 317). Wheeler 
was "forever in feuds," Shesol explains, and "there was no one 
he resented more than Franklin Roosevelt" (p. 318). An early 
supporter of Roosevelt in 1932, Wheeler was ''never 
wholeheartedly for ... [the president]" after failing to obtain the 
Vice Presidential nomination that year (p. 319). a[D]etermined 
to pull Roosevelt down," Wheeler seized on Court-packing as a 
way to do that (p. 321). And what Wheeler "resented most" (p. 
321) was the idea of Roosevelt in the forefront: 
''Who does Roosevelt think he is?" Wheeler barked at a 
White House aide. "He used to be just one of the barons"-
like Wheeler himself, or Huey Long. Now, Wheeler said, 
Roosevelt was "like a king trying to reduce the barons" (p. 
321). 
For Shesol, this observation reflected only jealousy-not 
genuine concern about concentrated executive power. 
Other opponents receive similar treatment. Newspaper 
publisher "Frank Gannett was a man of principle,''' Shesol writes 
(p. 364). But instead of analyzing his principles, Shesol notes that 
Gannett "aligned himself with a cast of characters who could he 
reasonably described ... as '100°/o racketeers and opportunists 
... [with] nothing but self-interest at stake"' (p. 364). Senator 
Hiram Johnson's opposition was "at once personal, political, and 
ideological", Shesol writes (p. 316). But Supreme Power explores 
only the personal and political sources of opposition, ignoring 
the "ideological." 
In one instance, Shesol does connect the opposition to 
deeply held beliefs-racist beliefs. Shesol explains that 
Southerners Democrats "perceived, correctly ... that FDR was 
trying to shake up southern political alignments ... and ... bring 
blacks and whites together in shared support for his programs, 
his principles, and himself" (p. 314). These Southerners feared 
that a packed Court "would end segregation" (p. 315). Shesol's 
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analysis is astute and seems correct. But he does not treat non-
racist views about juridical independence or excessive executive 
power in the same way- as motives for political action. Nor does 
he explain why Southern arguments about liberty and judicial 
independence appealed to non-racists. 
Shesol's approach is encapsulated in a newspaper column 
written by Pearson and Allen and quoted in Supreme Power: 
[B]ehind the opposition of almost every liberal or Democratic 
Senator fighting Roosevelt . . . is some hidden factor other 
than conviction. Conviction, principle, and saving the country 
are what he [the liberal] talks about. But these high-sounding 
phrases are camouflage. There is always something 
underneath (p. 352). 
Shesol adds that "to be fair, some Democratic senators opposed 
the Court bill out of conviction"- but goes on to mention only 
Wheeler in this connection, noting that "in Wheeler's case, there 
was plenty underneath" (p. 353). 
Discounting principle as he does, Shesol finds the Senate 
Judiciary hearings on court-packing remarkable. He writes: 
On the whole, the hearings were perhaps surprisingly 
substantive, drawing deeply on the debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, landmark cases, legal doctrines, 
British common law, even the practice of judicial review in 
France and Argentina (p. 420). 
Yet Shesol's brief account of the hearings ignores the 
"substance." He dismisses as fanciful any idea that court packing 
was a harbinger of dictatorship (p. 418). Instead, Shesol focuses 
on Southern concerns about school desegregation (p. 419). 
With political principle slighted, only self-interest is left to 
motivate opponents. But even if Pearson and Allen were right 
about liberal and Democratic opponents, presumably some 
Republicans- and lawyers, law professors, commentators, 
newspapers and ordinary citizens- opposed Court packing out 
of genuine commitment to principle. Supreme Power largely 
ignores such figures, few of whom could have a personal grudge 
against Roosevelt. Nor does political ambition or animus explain 
why two-thirds of the newspapers that had supported 
Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 opposed Court-packing only a few 
months later-a fact Shesol himself reports (p. 301). 
Supreme Power treats principles as a medium of political 
maneuvering, nothing more. The book's great failing is that it 
overlooks the stakes for the Court and the country. This 
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obscures, in turn, how political tactics affected the outcome, 
since those tactics were designed precisely to appeal to 
principles. 
B. PRESIDENTS 
Supreme Power lacks a hero, but it has an unmistakable 
star-Franklin Roosevelt. Depicting Roosevelt's opponents as 
opportunists, Shesol well might have portrayed Roosevelt as the 
avatar of high principle. But in Supreme Power, Roosevelt is 
neither right nor wrong. 
He does emerge in very favorable light, however. First, 
Roosevelt attracts the sympathy that naturally attaches to the 
central figures in a narrative. Events revolve around him, and 
readers see things from the President's vantage point. Shesol's 
focus on political maneuvering only enhances this effect. 
Supreme Power describes a kind of political boxing match, and it 
places readers in Roosevelt's corner. 
Second, although Shesol generally does not assess the 
arguments being made, he paraphrases and son1etimes quotes 
them. And Roosevelt gets quoted earlier and more often than 
opponents. Moreover, Roosevelt truly believed in a living 
Constitution, whose meaning changed with the titnes. His words 
were eloquent and seemed deeply felt. 
Third, Roosevelt does not emerge from the book as the 
menacing near dictator that opponents feared. The President 
lost the Court-packing battle, after all, and he accepted the 
result. Beyond that, many readers will respond more 
sympathetically to Roosevelt's concerns about the Depression 
and human suffering than to opponents' political and economic 
abstractions- particularly when Shesol takes those abstractions 
lightly or links them to Southern racism. 
Finally, Supreme Power does not ascribe the same kind of 
motives to Roosevelt that it does to critics. Instead, Roosevelt is 
concerned about the country as its President-the closest things 
to being right that one finds in Supreme Power. Presidential 
advisors and aides benefit from similar treatment. Opponents act 
out of political calculation and pique, but Shesol never 
speculates about the motives of presidential staffers and 
supporters- as if no one calculates before supporting presidents 
or gain personally from doing so. 
1. February 5, 1937-Predictably, then, Shesol focuses on 
what FDR said when he unveiled the Court-packing proposal on 
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February 5, 1937. The problem, Roosevelt informed the nation, 
was "aged or infirm judges-a subject of delicacy and yet one 
which requires frank discussion" (p. 294 ). Federal court dockets 
were "overcrowded" and younger judges could speed the courts' 
work (p. 294 ). Observing that the Supreme Court declined to 
hear many cases, Roosevelt implied that advanced age kept 
justices from keeping up. To remedy the situation, he proposed 
adding an additional judge to federal courts whenever an 
incumbent judge failed to retire at age seventy. On the Supreme 
Court, the result would have been fifteen justices-and six 
vacancies for Roosevelt to fill with his own appointees. 
The references to age were a critical mistake, Shesol 
believes. Roosevelt had received criticism during the reelection 
campaign for not discussing his intentions toward the Court (p. 
302). "That might not have mattered," Shesol writes, 
had Roosevelt, on February 5, gone before the nation, 
described, in plain language, the dangers of a conservative 
Court, and presented his plan as the best and most moderate 
means of reform (p. 302). 
References to age opened Roosevelt to the charge that he was 
engaged in a subterfuge. The Washington Post commented that 
Roosevelt's ostensible concern for efficiency had not hidden the 
"real objective" which was "mak[ing] the Supreme Court 
amenable to his will" (p. 302). Before the end of February 
Roosevelt himself acknowledged the error, saying 
I made one major mistake when I first presented the plan. I 
did not place enough emphasis upon the real mischief- the 
kinds of decisions which, as a studied and continued policy, 
had been coming down from the Supreme Court (p. 368). 
To which Shesol adds: 
It had taken him [Roosevelt] three weeks to admit this 
mistake-three crucial, costly weeks-ample time for his 
credibility to be battered, enemies emboldened, and goals put 
at risk. And so, in the final days of February, he resolved to 
do what he should have done from the start: to take the fight 
directly to the Court and put the real issue before the 
American people (p. 368). 
With its support from Roosevelt himself, this view cannot 
be taken lightly. Yet it seems difficult to accept at face value. 111 
111. Despite his reference to a "major mistake," Roosevelt reiterated a need for 
"new blood" on the bench in August. 1937 (p. 517) (noting that observers were 
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For one thing, Roosevelt did express a desire to change the 
Court's constitutional decisions on February 5. He said: 
Modern complexities call ... for a constant infusion of new 
blood in the courts . . . . Little by little, new facts become 
blurred through old glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of 
another generation; older men, assuming that the scene is the 
same as it was in the past, cease to explore or inquire into the 
present or the future .... 
A constant and systematic addition of younger blood will 
vitalize the courts and better equip them to recognize and 
apply the essential concepts of justice in the light of the needs 
and facts of an ever-changing world (pp. 295-96). 
This left no doubt about what everyone knew already- that 
Roosevelt wanted Justices who would reach different 
constitutional results. Shesol himself observes that the infirm 
judge argument "fooled no one" (p. 302). Roosevelt's purpose 
was so transparent that reporters "broke up in laughter" at the 
words "aged and infirm judges"- to the President's delight" (p. 
294). 
True, newspapers like the Post saw duplicity and "deeper, 
darker aims" (p. 302). William Allen White likened FDR's 
"trick" to the tactics of a European dictator (p. 302). A later 
White House memo even alluded to the apparent "political 
trickery" in Roosevelt's February 5 remarks (p. 302). Yet 
Shesol's "plain language" strategy- that is, avowing that Court 
packing was designed to change Supreme Court decisions-
seems unlikely to have made much difference. In effect, Shesol 
argues that Roosevelt should have made explicit the very 
"deeper darker aim" that newspapers denounced. And 
throughout Fehruary political insiders continued to believe that 
the Court-packing plan would become law (p. 300). If the 
February 5 speech represented a tactical rnistake, Shesol 
probably overstates its effects. 112 
Having ruled out principled opposition to Court-packing, 
and treating the President as the prime mover of events, Shesol 
almost had to trace the opposition to something Roosevelt said, 
"incredulous" at Roosevelt's doing so). A month later Roosevelt observed that the Court 
had "overruled" itself after his ·'message ... on the rejuvenation of the judiciary" (p. 
518). 
112. For a similar analysis, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 218 (2009) (observing that "Roosevelt's initial message on the 
plan was not nearly as disingenuous as critics complained."). 
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for no other possibility existed. The irony is that, in an account 
that gives no weight to principles, Shesol argues that Roosevelt 
erred by not launching a principled debate. 
Shesol's discussion of Chief Justice Hughes' famous letter to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee reflects the same general 
approach. Noting that the Court was "fully abreast of its work," 
Hughes' letter, according to Shesol, "destroy[ed] the myth of the 
Court's incapacity" (p. 393). 
The letter electrified the hearing room (p. 394). Hughes 
described the letter's effect as "devastating"; Robert Jackson 
thought it "pretty much turned the tide" (p. 400).m Yet the 
impact of Hughes' letter did not mean Roosevelt's reference to 
"aged and infirm judges" had doomed Court-packing. More 
likely, Senators were struck by the drama of a Chief Justice 
taking a public stand against the President- a riveting 
development, no matter what the Chief Justice said (p. 394). 
And, by then, everyone acknowledged that constitutional 
decisions were the issue; according to Shesol, Roosevelt had 
shifted his ground months earlier. 114 FDR later described Hughes 
as "the best politician in the country" (p. 400). 
Roosevelt's invocation of "aged and infirm judges" had 
been a kind of code-which is why reporters laughed when they 
heard it. Coming from FDR, "aged and infirm" meant "the 
Court must be packed to change its decisions." And the Chief 
Justice's letter arguably employed the same code. Coming from 
Hughes, the "Justices are current with their work" meant "do 
not pack the Court." To be sure, the nature of the code eased 
Hughes' task: Chief Justices are supposed to address judicial 
efficiency. Yet as "the best politician in the country,'' Hughes 
very likely would have found a way of defending his Court no 
matter what Roosevelt had said. 
2. Judicial Review- In a way that Shesol overlooks, 
Roosevelt's "judicial efficiency" rationale might have been a 
favor to the Court. If Congress and the President pack the Court 
because they oppose its decisions, future presidents and 
legislatures likely will feel free to follow suit. But if the Court 
gets packed for reasons of efficiency, a different political 
precedent-arguably, at least-gets created. The Court's 
113. Shesol notes that "Jackson still thought 'there is no question that the President's 
plan will go through' -as well he might" (p. 401). 
114. Shesol himself notes that Hughes' letter "laid waste to an abandoned fortress" 
because the President had moved away from the judicial inefficiency argument (p. 401 ). 
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traditional role can co-exist with an efficiency rationale for 
Court-packing. But a "wrong decision" rationale gravely 
threatens judicial review. 
Roosevelt's opponents feared exactly that. The Chicago 
Daily Tribune, for example, asked what would happen if a future 
President with the power to pack the Court held "a fanatical 
belief in racial and religious intolerance" (p. 303). Shesol, 
however, remains unimpressed. He writes: 
But how was this supreme power to be exercised? How was 
the Court to be controlled, its decisions predetermined? .... 
H.L. Mencken wrote that if the plan passed, "the court will 
become as ductile as a gob of chewing gum, changing shape 
from day to day and even from hour to hour as this or that 
wizard edges his way to the President's ear." William 
Mitchell, attorney general under Hoover, charged that anyone 
willing to accept a Supreme Court seat under these 
circumstances would "know they must listen to their master's 
voice." And if, in the end, Roosevelt's justices failed to obey 
him, he would simply pack the Court again - and again, and 
again- until "in time," as the White House memo put it, 
mocking the notion, "all our children will be drafted to serve 
as justices" (p. 303-4). 
Here, Shesol broaches a pivotal idea by quoting an 
administration memo that mocks it. 
Fears for judicial review were well founded, however. Had 
Roosevelt succeeded, why would future Presidents and 
Congresses tolerate Supreme Court decisions that they strongly 
opposed- decisions such as those ending racial segregation, 
recognizing a right to abortion, protecting flag burning, or 
invalidating a bipartisan effort to balance the federal budget? 
The plan's defeat frequently gets cited as a precedent against 
overriding unpopular Court decisions through legislation or 
constitutional amendment. Had the plan been enacted, it 
presumably would have become a political precedent the other 
way. Had that happened, the Justices' mental calendar might 
forever read, "February 5, 1937." 
Shesol's argument to the contrary is brief. He acknowledges 
that Roosevelt would have filled vacancies with "reliable 
liberals" and "expected" them to be in "basic sympathy with his 
belief in a living Constitution" (p. 304). That did not mean, 
She sol writes, that newly appointed Justices "would remain 
reflexively loyal" or the President would have "some means of 
influencing. . . justices after appointing them." (p. 304). 
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Underscoring the point, Shesol notes that previous Presidents 
"complained- bitterly and with cause-of 'betrayal' at the hands 
of their own appointees"- but he does not mention that the 
performance of many other Justices confirmed Presidential 
expectations (p. 304). "FDR knew," Shesol concludes, that once 
a man had put on the judicial robes he could not be constrained 
or controlled" (p. 304). 
This analysis overlooks what actually happened. FDR said 
afterwards he had "lost the battle . . . but ... won the war" 
because the Court-packing proposal marked "a turning point" in 
the Court's approach to the Constitution (p. 522). Soon 
populated with Roosevelt appointees, the Court would not strike 
down another exercise of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause until 1994. Substantive due process doctrines underwent 
an equally dramatic shift, while the Tax and Spend Clause has 
remained a reliable source of federal legislative power since 
1937. With all that happening after Court-packing's defeat, one 
can only imagine how deferential the Court might have become 
if the proposal succeeded. Son1e Justices even cite the events of 
1937 as a cautionary tale counseling deference to the political 
branches.115 
What Shesol treats as a modest expectation-namely, that 
Justices share Roosevelt's conception of a "living 
Constitution" -was anything but that. Because the conception of 
a living Constitution affected every commerce, tax and spend, 
and substantive due process decision, Shesol claims that the 
President was not dictating particular case outcomes. Both 
logically and legally, however, Shesol is mistaken. Suppose a 
future president threatens to pack the Court unless the Justices 
adopt "originalism" and abandon any idea of a "living 
Constitution." When the Justices fail to comply, Congress 
expands the Court to fifteen members and the President 
appoints originalists to fill the six newly created seats. Together 
with some Justices already serving, the new members form a 
majority that overrules abortion rights, returns to the commerce 
clause jurisprudence of 1936, and declares Social Security, 
Medicare, and the Affordable Health Care Act unconstitutional. 
Would Shesol see no threat to the Court in any of this because 
the President only wanted to change the Court's philosophy, not 
dictate individual case results? And what if a liberal president is 
115. See discussion infra, Part VI.D.2. 
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then elected, and proposes adding yet more new seats in order to 
change the Court's prevailing philosophy back again? 
Discounting the risks of Court-packing is important to 
Shesol's overall approach. Had he acknowledged the real danger 
to the Court, ambition, pique, and racism would no longer 
completely explain the opposition; Roosevelt's adversaries also 
would be defending judicial independence. Speeches on both 
sides would become more than mere words. Nor would it be 
enough that Roosevelt was sincere and eloquent: the question 
would arise whether he was right. 
Internalists do not argue that the Court had nothing to lose 
in 1937. Instead, they claim that the Court in fact lost nothing 
because Justice Roberts never yielded to political pressure. For 
his part, Shesol demonstrates the unrealism of internalism about 
important events. Yet Shesol's claim that the Court had nothing 
to lose is just as unrealistic. 
C. THE VIEW FROM 1997 
Shesol served as a speechwriter in the Clinton 
administration, and distinctive features of Supreme Power 
appear to jibe with that role. Regarding presidents as prime 
political movers, attributing petty motives and jealousies to 
White House critics, overestimating the importance of political 
rhetoric-each seems a natural part of a presidential 
speechwriter's outlook. Beyond that, however, Supreme Power 
may reflect the distinctive perspective of a speechwriter in the 
Clinton Administration. 
The Court-packing controversy appears very different at 
first glance from the mid-1990's scandal over President Clinton's 
involvement with a White House intern. Yet significant parallels 
exist. Both percolated during an administration's first term and 
erupted shortly after the president's reelection. Both involved 
courts, albeit in different ways. Both presidents lost their court 
battle and were politically weakened, significantly limiting what 
they accomplished afterwards. Both controversies defined a 
Democratic president's second term. 
Although the Roosevelt Administration became a political 
benchmark for later Democratic presidents, we do not know if 
Shesol viewed the Clinton Administration through a New Deal 
lens. However, Shesol seems to have done the reverse, using 
Clinton Administration scandals as a template for understanding 
the Court-packing controversy. In important ways, Shesol's 
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portrayal of 1937 echoes the views of Clinton supporters about 
1997. 
Clinton supporters viewed the intern scandal as a political 
invention of right wing opponents pursuing personal and 
political vendettas against the President-and hiding behind the 
facade of a concern for law. 116 Given that view, Clinton's aides 
likely regarded the real questions as purely tactical ones. Finally, 
Clinton himself transformed a possibly minor scandal into a 
political cataclysm with his early, misleading statements. 117 The 
parallels with Shesol's account of 1937 are obvious. 11 x 
It is striking how Shesol goes wrong at exactly the points 
where Court-packing and the Clinton scandals differ. Clinton's 
early statements (denying involvement with the intern) loomed 
large in his difficulties- and Shesol exaggerates the significance 
of Roosevelt's initial statements. 119 Clinton supporters saw no 
issues of principle at stake, and Shesol entirely misses issues of 
principle in 1937. The Clinton controversy manifestly was about 
Clinton himself. The Court-packing controversy, on the other 
hand, concerned the Supreme Court. Yet Shesol treats it as 
being about Roosevelt. 
With the political landscape of 1997 in his sights, Shesol 
missed some of his 1937 targets. Yet Supreme Power offers a 
powerful account yielding very significant insights. And the 
book's hits are related to its misses. Shesol renders the events of 
1937 with enormous care-as important in their own right, not 
props in an allegory about law- precisely because of their 
powerful personal resonance. Regarding 1997 as an affront, 
Shesol records every detail of 1937 as if it mattered. 
V. THE HISTORICAL DEBATE REVISITED 
The words "'internalism" and "externalism" suggest a 
historical dispute driven by philosophical differences about the 
nature of law. But why does the historical disagreement involve 
116. See generally MICHAEL ISIKOFF, UNCOVERING CLINTON: A REPORTER'S 
STORY, vii (2000) (describing the view of "Clinton's most sophisticated defenders."). 
117. See id. at 331-33, 350-52 (describing the deposition and 60 Minutes interview 
where he denied having sexual relations with Monica Lewinski). 
118. Having served in an administration that suffered enormous damage from the 
President's extramarital relationships, it is suggestive that Shesol describes Missey 
LeHand as Roosevelt's "influential secretary" (P. 17) and his "assistant'' (p. 94), but 
never mentions FDR's intimate relationship with her. 
119. See id. at 344-49 (discussing political and legal ramifications considered by 
Clinton and aide when the Lewinski story broke). 
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anything more than a set of conflicting conclusions about 
events? How can a debate about what happened in 1937 turn on 
general views about law? 
This Part argues that an internalist, concept-driven 
characterization of the historical debate -like the internalist, 
doctrine-driven account of 1937 -is, as a matter of fact, wrong. 
A. VARIETIES OF INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM 
On an internalist version of the historical de bate, as I will 
call it, two competing conceptions of law are in conflict. The 
philosophy of legalism, which views law as autonomous from 
politics, underlies internalism.120 Legal realisrn supposedly 
undergirds externalism.121 
Other views of the debate exist, however. According to 
what might be called debate externalism, political or other non-
philosophical agendas motivate historians in the controversy. 
And according to what might be termed debate agnosticism, 
"internalism" and "externalism" represent analytically unhelpful 
categories, with no more relevance to the issues than current 
religious views might have to a dispute about events in the 
Middle Ages. 
To understand the debate, it will be helpful to understand 
the varying strength of internalist or externalist views of 1937. 
The "strongest" views hold that the nature of law shaped events. 
Politics did not drive constitutional change in 1937, a strong 
internalist might say, because law by nature is autonomous from 
politics. For a strong externalist, on the other hand, politics had 
to drive legal change in 1937 because law is inherently political. 
There is a range of "strong" views. Only the very strongest 
would hold that Justice Roberts necessarily acted for legal or 
political reasons. And no one consistently advances such a view. 
No internalist argues, for example, that legal institutions never 
can become politicized- a position belied by both logic and 
history. Law may be generally autonomous, but it can be 
corrupted at times. Court-packing opponents feared precisely 
that; they believed Roosevelt's plan would transform an 
autonomous body of constitutional law into a politicized one. 
The strongest possible externalist account-politics 
decisively shapes law-might not be utterly implausible. But it 
120. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 291 (1998). 
121. /d. 
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would be completely unhelpful. Even if law is unavoidably 
political, Justice Roberts need not have "switched'' in 1937 
because he feared Roosevelt or because of worries about judicial 
review. In fact, on a strong legal realist view law would remain 
political no matter what Roberts did: law would be no less 
political had Roberts voted with the conservatives Justices in 
1937. 
Weaker variants of internalism and externalism are more 
plausible. A internalist might believe, for instance, that it was 
unlikely politics motivated Justice Roberts because law is 
generally autonomous from politics. An externalist might hold 
that the political content of legal decisions varies- but that the 
political content is usually high in constitutional cases. 
Debate internalism and externalism may arise from 
someone's internalist or externalist view of events. If the nature 
of law influenced events, someone who misunderstands the 
nature of law will necessarily misunderstand what happened. 
Thus, a strong legalist will hold that externalists err about events 
as a consequence of their mistaken view of law. A strong legal 
realist will believe the same thing about internalists. 
Views of the events and views of the debate do not always 
correspond, however. For example, a strong event externalist 
might suppose that a mistaken philosophy of legalism explains 
internalists' errors regarding the events. The result would be an 
externalist view of events combined with an internalist view of 
the historical debate-internalist because it posits a debate 
driven by philosophical differences about law. On the other 
hand, an externalist about events may well favor a political or 
agenda driven explanation for historians' conclusions. The result 
would an externalist account of both the events and the 
historical debate, seeing worldly agendas as the driving force in 
both. 
Or consider a historian who regards the nature of law as 
irrelevant for an understanding of the events. This historian 
might find philosophy irrelevant to the historical debate, as well 
as to the events, and shun the terms "internalist" and 
"externalist." But another possibility exists. Suppose the 
historian concludes that politics influenced Justice Roberts. He 
or she might also conclude that historians who reach a different 
conclusion were led astray by their views about the nature of law 
or by their political agendas, which distorted their assessment of 
the historical evidence. Such views, which do not rely on the 
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nature of law to establish what happened in 1937, may be called 
"weak debate internalisnz" and "weak debate externalisrn," 
respectively. 
Weak debate internalism and weak debate externalism both 
feature prominently in the literature, but for different reasons. 
Consider the situation of a relatively strong event internalist. No 
one, as just noted, considers it absolutely impossible for politics 
to have influenced Roberts. Thus, even relatively strong 
internalists will examine what happened, producing a narrative 
about singular, unique events. Having done that, however, 
internalists will be inclined to rest their conclusions on that 
narrative, not on their general views about law. A.n example is 
Cushman's claim that the Justices had no reason to fear Court-
packing. 122 
When making particular historical arguments, a strong 
internalist like Cushman is in the same position as an historian 
who deems the nature of law irrelevant. Thus, in addition to 
some relatively strong internalist arguments about events, 
Cushman makes weak internalist arguments about the debate. 123 
That is, he argues not only that externalists m:ust be wrong 
because of the nature of law influenced events, but also that 
externalists misinterpret the facts because legal realism blinds 
them to what actually happened. 124 Thus, a relatively strong 
internalist about events may describe the debate in weak 
internalist terms. 
A different consideration explains the frequency of weak 
externalist arguments about the debate. It is not that strong 
externalists, like strong internalists, make arguments 
independent of their philosophy of law. Rather-and despite the 
very idea of an internalist versus externalist debate- there 
simply are no strong externalists. No one argues that Roberts' 
switch was probably political because politics usually influences 
judges. 
In fact, so-called "externalists" in the debate have no need 
to appeal to the general nature of law. These historians focus on 
singular events, arguing that Roberts responded to an almost 
unprecedented threat to judicial review. In that argument, the 
nature of law and its general relationship to politics are 
irrelevant. Internalists, on the other hand, invoke the nature of 
122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
123. See discussion infra, Part V.B.1. 
124. See supra note I i, at 5. 
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law because events- Roberts' votes in 1936 and 1937 and 
political circumstances after the 1936 election-run counter to 
their conclusions. Internalists therefore posit a separate legal 
realm to make their case, a realm where ordinary legal processes 
were supposedly at work. Externalists, on the other hand, need 
not posit hidden realms to make their case. 
There is a related point. If strong event externalists existed, 
they would cite worldly agendas and motives, on the part of 
Justices as well as others. But that is the very analysis that 
political figures, newspapers and lawyers routinely engaged in 
during the 1930's. And one need not subscribe to any philosophy 
of law, or even know that such philosophies exist, to form the 
idea that Justice Roberts "switched" at a time of maximum 
political pressure. Unless, of course, debate internalists are right 
and the common sense of observers in 1937 was not common 
sense at all, but the reflection of a pervasive, yet mistaken, 
philosophy of law. 
B. REPRESENTATIVE VIEWS 
1. Strong and Weak lnternalism-Felix Frankfurter is 
perhaps the strongest internalist on record. In his 1955 tribute to 
Roberts, described earlier, Frankfurter argued it was "ludicrous" 
to believe political developments had influenced the J ustice. 125 In 
ruling out that possibility, Frankfurter cited Roberts' personal 
and judicial character-as if only a corrupt judge would have 
saved the Court from packing. 12~> Frankfurter's unstated premise 
was that judges operate in a legal realm entirely insulated from 
politics, making it an anathema for a judge to take politics into 
account. 
This argument from "character" was not likely to fare well 
in the culture of the 1960's. Nor had anyone had ever accused 
Roberts of switching for corrupt reasons. If Roberts did respond 
to political pressure, it had been to save the Court- even though 
those who believe Roberts did switch do not portray him as 
heroic. 
Forty years later, Cushman voiced a relatively strong 
internalist characterization of the debate, one that echoed 
elements of Frankfurter's tribute. Cushman wrote: 
125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
126. See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 313. 
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To embrace the thoroughgoing externalist account ... is to 
deny the constitutional jurisprudence of the period any status 
as a mode of intellectual discourse having its own internal 
dynamic. It is to dismiss the efforts of the lawyers defending 
the constitutionality of New Deal initiatives as irrelevant and 
redundant, to deprive Hughes and Roberts of a substantial 
measure of intellectual integrity and personal dignity, and to 
suggest that sophisticated legal thinkers casually discard a 
jurisprudential worldview formed over the course of a long 
!ifetime ~imp~~ because it becomes momentarily politically 
mconvement. 
This came close to suggesting that, because of the nature of law 
and the character of the Justices, internalism must be right and 
externalism wrong. Cushman certainly claimed that externalism 
is implausible on its face. 12x He even hinted that externalism 
offers a choice that one should reject out of respect for law and 
lawyers- that externalism is "wrong" in almost a moral sense. 129 
On this view, it is externalists, not Justice Roberts, who 
contaminate law with politics. 
As noted in the previous section, modern internalists 
usually do not go so far. Instead, they embrace what I have 
called weak debate internalism, claiming that externalists 
misconstrue events because of their overly politicized view of 
law. White argues, for example, that externalilsts go wrong 
because of their erroneous "starting assumlptions about 
constitutional interpretation, the relationship of judging to 
politics, and the nature of constitutional change."130 At another 
point, Cushman himself describes externallism as the 
"conventional wisdom" that arose "at a point in American 
history when the field of constitutional cornmentary was 
dominated by scholars inclined to predominantly political 
explanations of judicial behavior." 131 
2. Weak Externalism-Externalist accounts of the debate 
are all of the weak variety, as noted earlier. M[ichael Ariens 
traces the origins of modern internalism to Frankfurter's 1955 
tribute. m Ariens demonstrates convincingly that until 1955 legal 
writers largely took it for granted that Roberts had "switched" 
127. CUSHMAN, supra note 11. at 4-5. 
12X. See id. at 5 ("there is good reason to doubt that it offers an accurate account."). 
129. See id. at 4-5. 
130. WHITE, supra note 32, at 16. 
131. CUSHMAN, supra note 11. at 4. 
132. Ariens. supra note 93. at 623. 
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for political reasons. 133 But Frankfurter's "revised history of the 
constitutional crisis" soon "became the accepted history in legal 
academia"134 as figures such Bernard Schwartz, Herbert 
Wechsler, Benjamin Kaplan, and David Currie-as well as 
authors of leading casebooks-embraced the idea of a con-
stitutional revolution driven by law, not politics. 135 
Cushman cited historians' commitments to legal realism as 
the source of error; Ariens points to worldly considerations. He 
argues that Frankfurter's purpose-and the motive behind 
internalism generally- is "to preserve the role of the Court as a 
principled decisionmaker, a need that was particularly acute 
because of Brown [ v. Board of Education], which raised the issue 
of the Court's authority in a manner reminiscent of the crisis of a 
generation before." 136 Though offering worldly reasons for 
internalists' errors, Ariens never suggests that the nature of law 
supports an externalist account. 
William E. Leuchtenburg, perhaps the leading externalist, 
takes an even "weaker" position on the debate than Ariens. 
Leuchtenburg generally does not refer to "internalists" or 
"externalists" at all. Reviewing various historical arguments-
for example, the claim that constitutional law continued on a 
course fixed in Nebbia, or that poor draftsmanship and appellate 
advocacy explain the government's pre-1937 SuRreme ~ourt 
defeats- Leuchtenburg rebutted each separately. · He neither 
grouped them together under an "internalist" rubric nor 
attempted to explain, as Ariens did, what prompted historians to 
endorse mistaken positions. 
3. Internalism-Externalism Hybrids- Combining internalist 
and externalist elements, hybrid theories emerged in the 1980s. 
These theories took two forms: conceptual and empirical. Bruce 
Ackerman, for example, created a conceptual version. 13R 
Ackerman agreed with externalists that political developments 
had produced profound constitutional change.m Ackerman 
conceptualized these political developments, however, as the 
133. /d. at 631-34. 
134. /d. at 652. Ariens provides numerous examples, id. at 652-68, casting doubt on 
Cushman's description of externalism as the ''conventional wisdom." 
135. /d. at 652-55. 
136. /d. at 625. 
137. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). 
138. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 
(1989). 
139. /d. at 510-11. 
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equivalent of a prolonged, constitutional convention~ they 
transcended their political origins and becaJme legal and 
constitutional in nature. 140 By expanding the concepts of "legal" 
and "constitutional" in this way, Ackerman joined an externalist 
account of cause with an internalist characterization of change. 
Daniel Farber later offered an empirically based hybrid. He 
identified three causes for constitutional change during the 
1930's: an altered "Zeitgeist" (internalist); political pressure 
from Roosevelt ( externalist); and the appointment of relatively 
liberal Justices by President Hoover during the 1920's-when 
conservative appointments by Hoover would have guaranteed a 
conservative majority in 1937 no matter what Roberts did. 141 
Judicial appointments themselves represent a kind of hybrid. 
They are internalist, because they involve nothing out of the 
ordinary legal1y; they are externalist, because they reflect 
decisions by political branches and are not doctrinal. 
Farber, like Ackerman, accepts internalism and externalism 
as analytical starting points. However, both believe that a ful1 
account must combine elements of both positions. A fair 
inference from their view is that an internalist-externalist debate 
may once have been appropriate, but we are now in a position to 
choose the best of each side, putting an end to that stage of the 
debate. 
4. A Permanent Debate-Cushman's com1nent about a 
"thoroughgoing externalist account," quoted earllier, suggests a 
variation on the idea of an internalist-externalist debate. In this 
version, internalism and externalism represent choices that are 
not entirely a function of the historical evidence. Elaborating on 
the idea, Cushman wrote: 
The conventional wisdom [externalism] is . . . long overdue 
for some serious scrutiny, for two reasons. First, there is good 
reason to doubt that it offers an accurate account. The nature 
of the external account and the evidence available preclude it 
from being conclusively disproved in its entirety. There is no 
utterly irrefutable smoking gun: both the conventional 
wisdom and its critique [internalism] necessarily rest on 
circumstantial evidence. Nevertheless, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that the external account is not nearly as 
compelling as has conventionally been thought, that it 
certainly has been overstated, and that it may very well be just 
140. /d. at 510-15. 
141. Farber, supra note 25, at 1006. 
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plain wrong. Second, the conventional account ... requires 
reexamination because it is certainly not a complete account, 
insofar as it neglects serious exploration of the internal 
d. . f h h 142 1mens10ns o t e p enomenon. 
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Here, Cushman suggests that neither internalism nor externalism 
may lend itself to some conclusive factual or conceptual 
demonstration. Apparently, then, historians enjoy a degree of 
freedom to choose between the two views- a fortunate 
circumstance for internalists, it may be noted, given how little of 
their political analysis survives Supreme Power. Cushman 
himself finds internalism superior because it pays attention to 
the "internal" dimensions of the problem- almost an aesthetic 
criterion. 
Laura Kalman, an externalist regarding events and an 
apparent internalist about the debate (who cites philosophical 
differences when examining historians' differences)- wrote even 
more explicitly than Cushman about the possibility of choice for 
historians. She wrote: 
I do not go as far ... as Cushman in maintaining that no 
"reductionist" model [externalism] is sufficient to explain the 
New Deal Justices' behavior. The model that so irritates him 
may indeed account for the Justices' actions. But Cushman 
has made a convincing case that the reductionist model is not 
the only explanation. Cushman has given us a story that will 
resonate with those who believe judges are not identical to 
politicians and will enrich their understanding of judicial 
motivation. By taking New Deal constitutional jurisprudence 
on its own terms and making sense of it, he has demonstrated 
that legal history can indeed be a genre of intellectual history. 
I simply continue to be interested in legal history as political, 
economic, and social history also. 143 
Kalman then managed to impart an externalist spin to debate 
internalism and the idea of choice. Observing that writers 
trained in law tended to become internalists while those trained 
in political history became externalists, she linked the 
occupational divide to the conceptual divisions among historians; 
Kalman wrote that she favored the view of political historians, 
142. CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 5. 
143. Kalman, supra note 7, at 2190; hut cf Mark Tushnet, The New Deal 
Constitutional Revolution: Law, Politics, or What?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1075 
(reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)) (noting that "[h]istorians oriented 
primarily to the legal profession ... have a professional interest in providing internalist 
accounts''). 
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since she was one, but suggested that lawyers might become 
internalists with just as much reason. 144 
Mark Tushnet went even further. 145 What Kalman con-
sidered relative to a scholarly discipline, Tushnet deemed 
relative to an era- the era when a historian was writing. Tushnet 
argued that the truth value of internalism and externalism 
depends on the understanding of law's relation to politics that 
prevails at any particular moment. 146 Historians do not select the 
position that pleases them; rather, internalism is literally true at 
some moments when history is written and false at others. 147 This 
position is both more abstract than internalism (since it suggests 
that prevailing concepts literally determine what is true) and 
more concrete than externalism (since those prevailing concepts 
are a function of time and place). 
All such relativistic views mislead, I believe. Consider again 
the analogy to a gunshot fired at the precise moment someone 
collapses to the ground. True, the shot might have missed and 
the victim could have collapsed from internal causes, such as 
ruptured blood vessel. Yet it seems wrong to clai1m that analysts 
are free to choose between the internal (blood vessel) or 
external (bullet) accounts depending on their own individual 
preferences or training. Nor does the prevailing view of ballistics 
and heart disease at any given time really answer the question of 
whether a bullet penetrated the victim. 
Without an autopsy, the evidence rnight remain 
"circumstantial'' and neither theory, in Cushman's term, would 
be "conclusively" rebutted. Yet the two accounts are hardly 
equal. If the victim fell precisely when the gun was fired, the 
gunshot becomes the presumptive cause. And Roberts did 
switch precisely when Roosevelt threatened the Court. It would 
be different if Cushman's claims about timing of Roberts' switch 
and the supposed likelihood that Congress would reject Court-
packing were right. Supreme Power, however, refutes those 
claims. 
Justice Roberts' switch in 1937 was remarkable, and it 
astounded contemporaries who lived through it- those who 
opposed Court-packing and those who supported it alike. 
Confident their eyes and ears had not deceived them, they would 
144. See Kalman. supra note 7, at 2206. 
145. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 1078-79. 
146. See id. at 1076. 
147. See id. at 1078. 
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be amazed to learn that later historians did not see what they 
had- or that later historians for some reason could choose what 
to believe about what happened. 
C. SUPREME POWER REDUX 
1. Shesol's Conclusions-Shesol alludes to the internalist-
externalist debate only briefly, and without using those terms. 
"Most" contemporaries, he writes, considered it "self-evident" 
that political reasons produced the Court's switch (p. 522). 
"Decades later, however, a number of historians, legal scholars, 
and others would question the claim" (p. 522). Shesol quotes 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that Roosevelt "won ... the 
way the Constitution envisions such wars being won- by the 
gradual process of changing the federal judiciary through the 
appointment process" -a view that overlooks the fact that the 
"switch" occurred before Roosevelt had appointed any Justices 
(p. 523). In a footnote, Shesol also cites articles by Kalman, 
White, Leuchtenburg and Ackerman, among others (p. 601, note 
top. 523). 
Shesol-who is anything but an internalist about events-
remarkably belongs to the "both views are right" or "'neither 
view can be established definitively" camp of debate internalism. 
Some writers, he notes 
place greater weight on the doctrinal changes that preceded 
the Court fight and doubt that the events of 1936 and 1937 
had much (or anything) to do with the shift in doctrine. At its 
core, this is not a debate about the timing of the 
transformation. It is an argument about the nature of the 
judicial process, and what makes judges decide as they do (p. 
523). 
Thus, whatever the problems with an internalist account of 
events, the historical debate concerns "the nature of the judicial 
process" and why judges "decide as they do"- a debate about 
legal philosophy. Shesol continues: 
After the Parrish decision, The New Yorker ridiculed the 
notion that "the Supreme Court's about-face was not due to 
outside clamor. It seems that the new building has a 
soundproof room, to which the Justices retire to change their 
minds." Still the myth of the Court as a "vehicle of revealed 
truth" ... incapable of doing that which the law and the facts 
did not require, had and still has resilience. To acknowledge 
that external events play a role in decisions is frightening to 
many, for it suggests that the judicial system is, in the end, not 
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one of laws but of men -and thus vulnerable to the prejudices 
and whims and base instincts of men. 
But this is a false dichotomy-that a nation is governed either 
by law or by men, rather than a dialectic between the two. It is 
one of the many unhelpful antitheses that prevailed at the 
time and persist to this day, among them the idea that the 
Court is either a purely legal institution or a political body ... 
that legal doctrines are either preordained by the Constitution 
or are artificial constructs . . . [or] that justices are either 
impervious to social, political, and cultural influences or 
utterly at their mercy. The reality ... is more complex (p. 
523). 
In this "more complex" reality, the justices "were not merely 
judges; they were ... politically minded and socially aware men" 
(p. 523). They were simultaneously "imbued with an ethic of 
impartiality"; '"capable of change: growth, regression, and 
inconsistency"; and, '"to different degrees, open to influence by 
legal briefs, oral arguments, pressure from their peers, and, not 
least, national events" (pp. 523-24). In a footnote, Shesol praises 
Kalman- whose relativistic view is described above- for 
providing "[t]he strongest argument for collapsing these false 
categories" (p. 601 note top. 523). And he concludes: 
It is, in the end, impossible to know what sways a judge. Even 
the judges themselves do not always know whether their 
decisions are driven, in the main, by doctrine or emotion, by 
the dictates of law or politics or conscience. ,.,Who knows 
what causes a judge to decide as he does?" Roberts once 
shrugged, reflecting on Parrish. "Maybe," he joked, "the 
breakfast he had has something to do with it" (p. 524). 
Thus, Shesol sees no room in the history of events for an 
internalist account. Unlike Cushman, however, She sol thinks 
that makes no difference: the nature of law still makes it 
impossible to determine why Roberts voted as he did. Shesol 
thereby severs the connection between historical events and 
conclusions. No matter how precisely Roberts' switch coincided 
with political pressure, it must remain "impossible to know what 
sway[ ed]" him. Yet Shesol never really explains why that 
remains "impossible" -and the entire rest of his book undercuts 
his argument. 
Like Kalman- whose "collapsing" of dichotomies Shesol 
endorses-Shesol combines externalism about events with 
internalism about the debate. In fact, he is both a stronger 
externalist and a stronger internalist than Kalman. Kalman 
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struggled visibly with conflicting historical views. Shesol 
effortlessly rejects the supposed "false" dichotomy between law 
and politics. On his view, the two are inextricably mixed-even 
when it looks for all the world as if you can tell them apart. It 
almost makes one wonder why Shesol bothered to write his 
book. 
2. Supreme Power in History-Shesol invariably identifies a 
hidden motive for the actions of Court-packing opponents. The 
same is not true of Roosevelt, however. Although Supreme 
Power does not explicitly portray Roosevelt as right, it never 
questions his motives. And, as we have just seen, Shesol does not 
ascribe motives to the Justices either, declaring it impossible to 
do so. 
More generally, the actors in Supreme Power either work 
for Roosevelt, oppose him, or write about him. But the Justices 
once again receive different treatment. Like the President, the 
Justices move through the book in their own orbit. 
Supreme Power tells the story of how those two orbits 
became aligned-with each other and, in the case of the Justices, 
with the modern world. Regarding the latter, Shesol's ultimate 
conclusion- that the Court "at long last ... reconciled itself to 
the twentieth century" -echoes Roosevelt's idea of a "living" 
Constitution (p. 520). It also happens to echo Roosevelt's 
remarks on February 5 about bringing the Court into the 
modern age. 
The development, Shesol implies, was both preordained and 
necessary. Supreme Power quotes a magazine writer's comment 
that when Chief Justice Hughes voted to uphold New Deal 
measures he "had the acumen to recognize the inevitable" (p. 
522). It also quotes Justice Roberts' later remark that "it is 
difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular 
urge ... for what in effect was a unified economy" (p. 522). 
Shesol does not mean that Hughes or Roberts consciously 
decided to accommodate the President, popular will, or 
economic reality; to the contrary, he observes that it "can never 
be known" whether Hughes "saw himself as responding to the 
dictates of the cases at hand, or was acting to save the Court or 
country" (p. 522).' 4ll Rather, the doctrinal switch simply had to 
happen-exactly as long-view internalists claim (p. 520). 
148. Shesol also observed that: 
even though the Parrish decision preceded the launch of the Court plan, a 
credible case can be made that Roberts and Hughes were influenced by the 
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Even events that seemed to stand in the way actually 
promoted the doctrinal shift, according to Shesol. Did the Court 
strike down New Deal measures? That only helped, Shesol says, 
because it "required FOR to answer a serious and sustained 
constitutional critique" (p. 521). As a resu1t, Roosevelt's 
"reforms, most people agreed, stood on more solid ground" (p. 
521). Did Court-packing critics pursue petty vendettas against 
Roosevelt? Grudgingly, Shesol allows that even Roosevelt's 
opponents contributed to the happy outcome. "[W]hatever the 
motives of Roosevelt's critics," he writes, 
it must be acknowledged that they provoked a debate about 
the constitutional principles of the New Deal-a debate that 
arguably needed to take place and that the congressional 
opposition was too enfeebled to lead (p. 520).149 
Like Shesol's depiction of events, these historical views may 
reflect his experiences as a speechwriter for President Clinton. 
Shesol surely witnessed small-bore politics at the White House. 
Presidential speeches, on the other hand, articulate grand 
themes and large principles. How to reconcile the two political 
realities? Describing 1937, Shesol treated political principles as 
purely rhetorical. Did that exhaust his views, however, about the 
relationship between high political ideals and not-so-high 
political maneuvering? 
Roosevelt had framed the fundamental political and legal 
issue in the Court-packing dispute as whether the Supreme 
Court would join the modern world. For Shesol, precisely that 
was the fundamental historical question as well. Supreme Power 
does not portray Roosevelt as right or wrong about the political-
legal issue. Yet the President was right about something more 
criticism of Tipaldo; or by rising popular exasperation with the Court; or the 
indignation of the legal journals; or the scale of Roosevelt's reelection, which 
surprised the justices; or, through 1936, the mounting threat- or certainty- that 
either FDR or Congress was about to take serious action to curb the Court. If 
any of this had an effect on the decision, it can never be measured; nor would it 
suggest that either justice changed his basic beliefs in the face of events. It may, 
however, have made each more likely to examine his beliefs and then act on 
them- to take a bold step, to confront a tough choice and no longer avoid it (p. 
415). 
In the next paragraph. however, Shesol commented that "one need not speculate wildly 
to posit that some of these events. to some degree, weighed on the minds of Roberts and 
Hughes and placed a finger on their internal scales" (p. 415). 
149. Shesol did not explain, however, why the debate "arguably needed to take 
place." Nor is clear why Shesol considers the "congressional opposition ... enfeebled"-
when members of Congress actually led the opposition. 
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profound, in Shesol's account- Roosevelt was right about the 
very direction of history. 
The historical dimension of events ennobled everyone in 
Shesol's eyes, even-as just noted-petty critics of the President. 
Yet Roosevelt played a unique role. I noted earlier that Shesol 
treats Roosevelt as the prime mover of events-a feature of the 
book that I described as a narrative device. But it was more than 
that, too. Other actors played roles in the historical drama; 
Roosevelt spoke for History itself. 
Thus, Shesol views presidents- at least some presidents, 
some of the time- as extraordinary political actors. Co-existing 
with their small bore political life-the world of tactics depicted 
in Supreme Power-is this special historical role, in which 
presidents embody and virtually personify the march of history. 
And when presidents are extraordinary political actors, their 
words must become more than ordinary political rhetoric. 
This may explain another apparent anomaly in the book. 
Shesol attached enormous significance to Roosevelt's February 5 
speech, which focused on elderly judges more than on 
constitutional interpretation. Treating the speech as a purely 
tactical mistake, Shesol seemed to greatly overstate its 
importance. Even more puzzling, Shesol suggested that 
Roosevelt should have frankly described his intention to change 
the course of constitutional decision-making-the very "deeper, 
darker aim" that newspapers would denounce after the speech. 
And this treatment of the speech seemed inconsistent with 
Shesol's treatment of principles throughout the rest of the book. 
But Shesol's deepest objection, it now appears, may have had 
nothing to do with tactics. On February 5 Roosevelt lost a 
chance to speak for History-and Shesol, the White House 
speechwriter, regrets it. 
Two observations seem in order. First, this historical 
dimension almost certainly was missing in the Clinton scandal of 
the 1990's-the scandal that, I argued earlier, supplied Shesol 
with a template for understanding the events of 1937. In the 
Court-packing controversy, Shesol perhaps discovered an 
alternate version of the narrative that played itself out in the 
Clinton White House-a version that, unlike the 1997 variant, 
had real historical meaning. 
Second, none of this detracts from the value of Shesol's 
account. Only superficially resembling long view internalism, 
Shesol's deep sense of history led him to faithfully and minutely 
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describe events. At times, Supreme Power even reads like a 
Greek tragedy. The book ends with Shesol's observation that 
while Roosevelt won the war over the Constitution, he "never 
regained his squandered mandate"150 -a phrase that describes 
the tragedy of Clinton's Administration at least as well as it does 
Roosevelt's (p. 524). 
VI.THEFUTURE 
A number of considerations suggest that the internalism-
externalism debate is about to become transformed, or even 
disappear. This Part explores some possibilities. 
A. FIRST POSSIBILITY: INTERNALISM IS REFUTED, AND THE 
DEBATE ENDS 
The debate might end because Supreme Power refutes 
critical parts of internalism. 
This outcome seems unlikely, however. If debate 
externalists are correct- and I believe they are- an agenda 
related to the Court motivates internalism. Thus, facts probably 
will not drive internalists from the field. Indeed, a version of 
events like Shesol's enjoyed almost universal acceptance until 
Frankfurter's 1955 tribute, yet internalism emerged and 
flourished. 
B. SECOND POSSIBILITY: NOTHING IS LEFT TO SAY 
Frankfurter's emphasis on the "character" of Justice 
Roberts in 1955 was not accidental. In the 1930's, Frankfurter 
had repeatedly denounced Roberts as political. 151 Without 
mentioning those earlier statements in his tribute, Frankfurter 
now declared it a mistake to assess Roberts based on the 
Justice's public actions. "Before I came on the Court," 
Frankfurter wrote 
I had been a close student of its opinions. But not until I 
became a colleague, and even then only after some time, did I 
come to realize how little the opinions of Roberts, J. revealed 
150. Recall that, for Shesol, Roosevelt's tragic blunder was not the Court-packing 
plan or what others saw as an assault on judicial independence; rather it was the content 
of his February 5 speech. 
151. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.(b). 
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the man and therefore the qualities he brought to the work of 
the Court. 152 
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Far from arguing that published opinions and public actions 
refute the charge of political influence- the claim internalists 
make-Frankfurter implied the exact opposite. Indeed, he antic-
ipated Shesol's "it is impossible to know what motivates a judge" 
argument-with the caveat that a close, longtime colleague on 
the bench can know what motivates a judge. 153 In this respect, 
Shesol (rather than Barry Cushman) is Frankfurter's true 
intellectual heir. 
Most of Frankfurter's tribute reads like a eulogy, not a 
contribution to legal history. But Frankfurter did reprint 
Roberts' memorandum and argue that Nebbia prefigured 
Roberts' vote on the minimum wage. 154 (Frankfurter said nothing 
about Roberts' 1936 and 1937 votes in commerce or tax and 
spend cases). Since existence of the memorandum had not been 
public before, this portion of the tribute did not strictly conflict 
with Frankfurter's claim that the publically known Owen 
Roberts was not the real person or judge. Still, Frankfurter's 
reliance on the memorandum appears at odds with his other 
claim. Could a short memorandum, written years later, really put 
outside observers in the same position to judge Roberts as a 
longtime colleague on the bench? 
Had Frankfurter not mentioned the memorandum, readers 
probably would have understood his tribute as a simple eulogy. 
And the internalist-externalist debate might never have begun. 
Almost no one disputes claims made in eulogies. Nor is it easy to 
imagine a decades-long debate about Roberts' character or 
about Frankfurter's suggestion that only a long-time colleague 
can assess another Justice's work. But Frankfurter did reproduce 
the memorandum, and the memorandum made disputable 
claims about Tipaldo and Parrish. And some of those claims 
proved mistaken -as have other important internalist claims 
about events. 
Like Frankfurter, internalists strive to create what Cushman 
called "intellectual space" for internalism in the history of the 
mid-1930's. Supreme Power demonstrates the error of doing so, 
however: the critical facts support externalism. Yet Supreme 
152. Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 311. 
153. See id. at 317 ("Few speculations are more treacherous than diagnosis of 
motives [behind] ... the position taken by Justices in Supreme Court decisions."). 
154. !d. at 314-15. 
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Power also shows a way out of this internalist dilen1ma. Shesol 
faithfully described events, yet he concluded that the reason for 
Justice Roberts' change of mind remains unknowable and that 
nothing objectionable happened in 1937. Shesol thereby 
accomplished what Frankfurter perhaps had aimed at in 1955. 
One may believe that Shesol's conclusions are misleading or 
wrong. But, as just noted, a sustained debate over "what is 
knowable about Justices' motivation" seems unlikely to arise. 
And with only philosophical issues remaining, the internalist-
externalist debate may well fade away. When internalists claim 
that the historical debate centers on philosophical differences, 
therefore, they may be making their best argurn.ent. Everyone 
can announce their different conclusions, and nothing else 
remains to be said. 
If debate externalism is correct, this may represent the most 
likely outcome. Internalists and debate externalilsts alike have 
assumed that an internalist account requires factual assertions 
about 1937. But Supreme Power and much of Frankfurter's 
tribute demonstrate that the most viable non-political portraits 
of 1937 must be abstract. Internalism may not need facts, and it 
seems to fare much better without them. 
C. THIRD POSSIBILITY: THE DEBATE IS MOOTED BY 
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE COURT 
Internalists like White and Cushman entertain a very broad 
sense of "legal.'' White considers cultural change the key to a 
legal revolution. And Cushman's "integrated legal fabric" is an 
academic, not a doctrinal, construct. Mark Tushnet even 
describes Cushman's as "a mixed-internalist-externalist account" 
because it "identifies social forces that led to [the constitutional] 
shift" in the fabric. 155 Internalists view law as autonomous from 
politics- but apparently not from much else. 
Towards the middle of the internalist-externalist spectrum, 
Richard Friedman takes seriously the possibility that Roberts 
reached the merits in Parrish because of political 
considerations-in particular, because the negative public 
155. Tushnet, supra note 143, at 1062. Tushnet, like Cushman, considers the 
"integrated fabric" a legal entity, a claim that seems questionable. The "integrated 
fabric" has no doctrinal status; nor does it aspire to any. It results from historians' efforts 
to understand the Court, not from anyone's efforts to understand the Constitution. And 
it supposes that law develops for reasons independent of judges' conscious deliberation. 
Why is such a view any more "legal" than, say, the claims of legal realism? 
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reaction to Tipaldo. 156 Regarding the Commerce Clause, 
Friedman goes still farther, saying that he "suspect[ s] Roberts 
had a conscientious change of mind, at least the substance of 
which, if not the timing, can be understood independent of 
political factors." 157 
Yet further along the internalist-externalist spectrum, 
Farber accepts Friedman's claim that the public reaction to 
Tipaldo may have influenced Roberts' decision to reach the 
merits in Parrish. 158 However, Farber also notes "Roberts's later 
statement that he was 'fully conscious' of the 'threat to the 
existing Court"'- the very threat that Cushman says never 
existed.159 Farber characterizes his own position as partly 
externalist because "it admits the possible short-term effect of 
the Court-packing plan in influencing a key voter [Roberts]. "160 
All these accounts clash, however, with Frankfurter's 
arguments about politics, morality and character. Frankfurter 
would hardly accept cultural change as a defense of a Justice's 
"morality." Nor would a Justice qualify as "moral" if political 
factors had influenced a decision to switch positions-not even if 
later historians considered the switch inevitable. 161 
The idea of an unraveling legal fabric would not have 
appealed to Frankfurter either. For one thing, it draws on the 
objectionable idea of inevitability. With the old legal fabric 
unraveling, Cushman appears to say, Justices had no choice but 
to wear the only other legal garment in their closet. 162 
Frankfurter, on the other hand, presupposed that individual 
judges made law- not that a fabric of law made the judge.163 
Frankfurter himself employed a "fabric" metaphor, but one 
with very different implications. "Owen J. Roberts contributed 
his good and honest share," Frankfurter wrote, "to that coral-
156. Friedman, supra note 25, at 1951. 
157. /d. at 1982-83. Friedman also argued that Roberts' vote in Jones & Laughlin 
"probably reflected a change- but a legitimate change-in his views." /d. at 1973. To 
support the idea that politics did not motivate Roberts, Friedman relies on Cushman's 
argument about an interrelated constitutional fabric and his claim that the 1936 election 
did not influence Roberts. 
158. Farber, supra note 25, at 1001. 
159. !d. at 1000. 
160. /d. at 1006. 
161. See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 314 ("That the Supreme Court should not be 
amenable to the forces of publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are 
subjected is essential to the functioning of the Court."). 
162. See CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 7. 
163. See Frankfurter, supra note 86, at 316-17 (discussing Roberts' opinion in 
Nebhia and its role in deciding Parrish). 
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reef fabric which is law.'~ 1 (l4 Unlike the ''integrated fabric," 
however, Frankfurter's ''coral-reef fabric" was not manufactured 
according to a discernible academic pattern. Nor was it 
something a judge fit into. More to the point, a coral-fabric 
cannot "unravel" -it is more substantial than that--a coral reef 
cannot easily be replaced by another one as if the earth was 
simply changing its clothes. 
The gap between Frankfurter and later writers suggests that 
the law-politics boundary has shifted since 1955. What counted 
as too political-- or, at least, too non-legal- for Frankfurter may 
have come to appear acceptably legal since. And with a larger 
admixture of politics acceptable in law, the gap between 
externalism and internal ism should shrink. On Shesol 's view-
which regards law versus politics as a "false dichotomy" -no 
boundary at all exists. 
The law-politics boundary in fact has become more porous 
since 1955, I believe. Yet that development has not damped 
down the debate. Instead, internalism experienced a revival 
during the 1990's with White's and Cushman's work. And public 
discussion of the Court-particularly in connection with the 
confirmation of Justices-continues to posit a sharp line between 
law and politics. 16~ At least in the near future, it appears, 
changing views about law and politics are unlikely to mute the 
internalism-externalism debate. 
Paradoxically, these changing conceptions 1night even 
intensify the debate. A confident legalist, without doubts about 
law~s autonomy, might readily admit that politics motivated 
Roberts. Roberts' switch would constitute a rare anomaly. On 
the other hand, someone insecure in their legalism might 
hesitate to admit even a single breach of the law-politics 
boundary- because one breach might signal a general collapse. 
Perhaps Frankfurter fell into this category, and his reassurances 
about Justice Roberts were directed at himself as much as his 
audience. 
164. Frankfurter, supra note ~6. at 317. 
I o5. See, e.g, Charles W. Rhodes, Navigating the Path of the Supreme Appointment, 
38 FLA. ST. U .L. REV. 537, 542-43 (2011) (theorizing that the public requires the Court 
to have a "greater separation from ordinary politics"). 
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D. FOURTH POSSIBILITY: UPHEAVALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW TRANSFORM THE DEBATE 
l. A Non-Doctrinal Debate- The historical debate over 
1937 has some striking similarities with the controversy over 
Court-packing. Many Court-packing opponents shared 
Roosevelt's hope that the Court would change direction; they 
objected only to that happening in a blatantly political way. 
Somewhat similarly, internalists do not object to the Court's 
change of direction in 1937- indeed, they sometimes portray it 
as inevitable- but object only to the idea that politics caused it. 
For that matter, long-view internalists echo Roosevelt's claim 
that modern conditions required changes in constitutional law-
even as they deny that Roosevelt's political insistence on that 
very point made any difference. 100 Obvious parallels also exist 
between Court-packing supporters and externalists-with the 
former hoping, and the latter believing, that politics could 
change the Court's direction. 
2. Commerce- Liberal opponents of Court-packing may 
have shared many of Roosevelt's views; conservative opponents 
did not. And in the historical debate about 1937 only the 
"liberal" side seems represented. No writer cited in this review, 
for example, shows any sympathy for the conservative Justices of 
1937. 
Constitutional law today exhibits a pronounced liberal-
conservative split. And one might expect the historical debate to 
become transformed if that debate becomes implicated in- or 
even relevant to-current doctrinal disputes. The Justices who 
voted to strike down the Affordable Care Act in Sebelius, for 
example, might well view 1937 differently from either 
internalists and externalists in the current debate. 
In a few cases, Justices themselves have invoked 1937 to 
defend or criticize a result. In particular, Justices have done so 
when dissenting from a decision that the federal government 
lacked power to act under the Commerce Clause. In these cases, 
"liberals" invoked 1937 -yet their views did not conform to the 
"internalism versus externalism" template. 
The first opinion of this kind was Justice Brennan's dissent 
in National League of Cities v. Usery, a 1976 decision (since 
166. See, e.g.. White, supra note 16, at 1110. 
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overruled) that limited congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate states.167 Brennan wrote: 
The only analysis even remotely resembling that adopted 
today is found in a line of opinions dealing with the 
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment that ultimately 
provoked a constitutional crisis for the Court in the 
1930's .... It may have been the eventual abandonment of 
that overly restrictive construction of the commerce power 
that spelled defeat for the Court-packing plan, and preserved 
the integrity of this institution .... My Brethren's approach to 
this case is not far different from the dissenting opinions in 
the cases that averted the crisis. 16x 
By "preserved the integrity of this institution" Brennan may 
have meant only that judicial review survived and the Court 
remained an "integral" part of our constitutional system. More 
likely, I believe, he also meant that the Court had compromised 
its integrity before 1937 by substituting the Justices' own 
political judgments for those of the political branches. Many 
observers in the 1930's-including Frankfurter-held that view, 
believing that conservative Justices were invalidating New Deal 
measures because they disagreed with them politically. This kind 
of political influence, however, does not register in the 
internalism-externalism debate. 
Dissenting in a 1994 case, United States v. Lopez,' '9 Justice 
Souter sounded similar themes. Lopez invalidated a federal 
regulation of private (non-state) activity as beyond the federal 
commerce power, the first time the Court had done so since 
1936.170 Souter wrote: 
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative 
judgments "is a paradigm of judicial restraint." In judicial 
review under the Commerce Clause, it reflects our respect for 
the institutional competence of the Congress . . . and our 
appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's 
political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide 
range of possible choices. 
It was not ever thus, however .... The modern respect for the 
competence and primacy of Congress in matters affecting 
commerce developed only after one of this Court's most 
167. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled hy Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
168. Usery, 426 U.S. at 867-68. 
169. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
170. ld. 
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chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier 
and untenably expansive conception of judicial review in 
d . f . 1 171 erogatlon o congresswna commerce power. 
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Six years later, United States v. Morrison struck down the federal 
Violence Against Women Act on Commerce Clause grounds. 172 
Again in dissent, Souter wrote about 1937 more explicitly: 
Since adherence to these formalistically contrived confines of 
commerce power in large measure provoked the judicial crisis 
of 1937, one might reasonably have doubted that Members of 
this Court would ever again toy with a return to the days 
before [Jones & Laughlin] ... which brought the earlier and 
nearly disastrous experiment to an end. 
Why is the majority tempted to reject the lesson so painfully 
learned in 1937?173 
Like Justice Brennan, Souter came close to saying that the Court 
had switched because of the Court-packing plan. How else could 
the Court have painfully learned a lesson in 1937? 
Justice Ginsburg alluded to the same points in her 2012 
Sebelius opinion, though less explicitly. Dissenting on the 
Commerce Clause issue, Ginsburg traced modern Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence to 1937174 and, using the same word as 
Justice Souter, characterized Schechter and Carter Coal as 
"untenable."175 She also cited Souter's Morrison dissent and the 
reference to a "nearly disastrous experiment. "176 Finally, 
Ginsburg observed that the Court had "[f]ail[ed] to learn from 
this history[.]" 177 Ginsburg's opinion was artfully ambiguous, 
however. For example, Carter Coal might have been 
"untenable" only doctrinally, and not-as Souter and Brennan 
had suggested-in an institutional sense, implicating the Court's 
position in our constitutional system. Ginsburg's reference to a 
"nearly disastrous experiment," however, indicates that she 
shared Brennan's and Souter's view. 
Like externalists, Brennan, Souter and Ginsburg suggest 
that Court-packing prompted the 1937 switch. Yet the usual 
171. /d. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
172. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
173. !d. at 642-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
174. Nat'l Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2609 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
175. /d. at 2622. 
176. ld. (quoting Morrison, 521 U.S. at 642 (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
177. Sehelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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internalist claim- that externalists overlook the internal life of 
law-would be extraordinary applied to a Justice. Moreover, 
these Justices viewed constitutional decisions of the 1930's as 
legally correct (e.g., Jones & Laughlin) or incorrect (e.g., Carter 
Coal). Since internalists do not incorporate the idea of "legally 
correct" in their analyses, that makes the Justices more "legalist" 
even than internalists. In short, these Justices strongly suggest 
that politics produced the constitutional switch in 1937 -and also 
that the switch should have occurred, because the Court had 
been wrong. Thus, Brennan, Souter, and Ginsburg simul-
taneously qualify as internalists and as externalists-and also as 
neither. The idea of an internalist-externalist debate simply fails 
to capture their views. 
3. Casey- The "switch in time" also received attention in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania vs. Casey, the 
1992 decision that reaffirmed a constitutional ri~ht to abortion. m 
Substantive due process was at issue in Casey, 1 9 tnaking Parrish 
the relevant 1937 case. And Justices on both sides of the 
abortion question thought Parrish had correctly overruled 
Lochner. Jso What divided them was why the Court was right to 
abandon Lochner in 1937. 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, who provided 
three of the five votes to uphold abortion rights, authored a joint 
opinion. Alluding to political pressure surrounding the abortion 
issue, they declared that "to overrule [Roe] under fire in the 
absence of the most compelling reason ... would subvert the 
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question." 1s1 That was 
because 
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions . . . as grounded truly in 
principle, not as compromises with social and political 
pressures . . . . [T]he Court's legitimacy depends on 
[that] .... 1S2 
And Parrish rightly overruled Lochner because 
the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed 
17H. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. R33 
( 1992). 
179. !d. at R46. 
1~0. Compare id. at ~61-62, with id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
1Rl. !d. at ~67. 
1~2. !d. at ~65-66. 
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unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation 
of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on 
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of 
a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of 
human welfare .... [H]istory's demonstration of their untruth 
not only justified but required the new choice of 
constitutional principle .... 1x3 
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Dissenting, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that political 
opposition to a constitutional decision was simply irrelevant. The 
Court had decided Parrish when the Court-packing plan was 
under consideration, Rehnquist noted, thus: 
[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Court would 
face more intense opposition to a prior ruling than it did at 
that time, and, under the general principle proclaimed in the 
joint opinion, the Court seemingly should have responded to 
this opposition by stubbornly refusing to reexamine the 
Lochner rationale, lest it lose legitimacy by appearing to 
"overrule under fire." 1x4 
Justice Scalia's opinion put the point more sharply, arguing 
that the joint opinion had adopted "not a principle of law ... but 
a principle of Realpolitik-and a wrong one at that." 1x' Justice 
Scalia also observed that Parrish 
produced the famous 'switch in time' from the Court's 
erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional opposition to 
the social measures of the New Deal 1x6 
-the only use of the phrase "switch in time" that I can find in 
any Supreme Court opinion. 
For the authors of the joint opinion, however: 
it was true that [in the mid-1930's] the Court lost something 
by its misperception, or its lack of prescience, and the Court-
packing crisis only magnified the loss; but the clear 
demonstration that the facts of economic life were different 
from those greviously assumed warranted the repudiation of 
the old law. 
The Casey joint opinion, like the Commerce Clause dissents 
noted above, includes views that call to mind long-view 
internalism. Internalists focus on changes in epistemology and 
183. !d. at 861-62. 
184. /d. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
185. /d. at 997-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
186. /d. at 998. 
187. /d. at 862. 
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economics; the joint opinion cited a changed understanding of 
basic economic facts. In Lopez, Justice Souter even linked 
changes in substantive due process doctrine during the mid-
1930's to changed views of the commerce power, partly echoing 
internalist claims about a doctrinal fabric. 188 Yet the joint 
opinion's express concern with the Court's legitimacy and its 
conclusion that the Court-packing crisis damaged that 
legitimacy-predictably-distinguish it from internalism. Once 
again, the idea of an internalist-externalist debate fails to capture 
the position of actual Justices on the Court. -,. 
4. The Next Upheaval-Suppose Justice Thomas' view that 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence took a wrong turn in 1937 
comes to command a majority of the Court-a development 
Sebelius makes at least conceivable.1g9 Thomas might argue that 
Jones & Laughlin deserved no deference as a precedent because 
political pressure, in the form of the Court-packing proposal, 
produced the decision. One can even imagine Thomas adopting 
themes from the Casey joint opinion, arguing that the legitimacy 
of the Court had suffered because of the "switch in time" and 
that the damage ought to be undone.190 Justices on the other 
side- those favoring an expansive interpretation of the 
commerce power-might also look to the Casey joint opinion, 
arguing that no new understanding of the facts had undermined 
Jones & Laughlin. Or they might shift ground, ernphasizing that 
Jones & Laughlin was correct as decided while avoiding 
references to the "lessons" of 1937 or to "avert[ing] ... the 
crisis" -in short, they could produce an opinion rnore like Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's in Casey. 
How might all this affect the historical debate? The year 
1937 would become a critical battleground, one with doctrinal-
not merely academic- implications. But exactly what would 
happen in the debate remains unclear. Justice Thomas, a 
constitutional originalist, might end up both a legalist about law 
188. Justice Souter observed that "[i]t was not merely coincidental ... that sea 
changes in the Court's conceptions of its authority under the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses occurred virtually together." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). What linked them, Souter argued, was "exacting judicial scrutiny 
of a legislature's choice of economic ends and of the legislative means selected to reach 
them." !d. 
189. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Court should "replace its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with 
a standard more consistent with the original understanding"). 
190. In the perhaps less likely event that a new majority decided to revive Lochner, 
an analogous argument would exist-namely, that Parrish resulted from political 
pressure. 
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generally and, as just noted, an externalist about 1937 -a 
combination of positions that standard views of the internalist-
externalist debate seemingly rule out. The minority Justices on 
the commerce question in Sebelius might abandon the externalist 
elements in Justices Brennan's and Souter's Commerce Clause 
dissents-or they might not. Today, internalists embrace the idea 
that Roosevelt's appointments after Jones & Laughlin advanced 
the constitutional revolution.191 But internalists favoring an 
expansive interpretation of the commerce power might object to 
a series of Supreme Court appointments by future presidents 
that solidified Justice Thomas' approach. These internalists of 
the future might conclude that appointments-based doctrinal 
change qualifies as political, not legal, after all- the view of 
many when President Grant's appointments (changing the 
outcome of the Legal Tender Cases) supposedly constituted 
"Court-packing." 192 
In short, some internalists would become externalists, and 
some externalists might become internalists. Legalism about law 
generally would come to differ from internalism about 1937; 
indeed, the most stringent legalists, like Justice Thomas, might 
become the strongest externalists. Judicial appointments might 
change from a component of legal change to a threat to the 
integrity of law. 
Doctrinal upheaval in the commerce area would also detract 
from the plausibility of long-view internalism. A strong 
consensus regarding the commerce power held sway during the 
mid-twentieth century, and internalists seemed to infer that the 
consensus view was somehow required- required by modern 
economics, modern epistemology, or modern history. If the 
Court overturns that supposedly inevitable consensus, however, 
the sense of inevitability may disappear along with the 
consensus. Instead, it will become clear that the Court could 
have chosen different doctrine at other times as well- including 
in 1937. For if five Justices can supposedly defy the modern 
world in Sebelius, why could not five do so in Jones & Laughlin 
too? Regarding the Commerce Clause, some perhaps will argue 
that the Sebelius majority failed to understand the modern 
economy or reverted to pre-modern understandings of law or of 
the world. Whatever the merits in such arguments, however, 
191. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 11, at 175. 
192. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointmmt to the Supreme 
Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 112X, 1130-31 (1941) (describing 
contemporary reaction to Grant's appointments). 
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they represent the opposite of internalist claims that economics 
or epistemology mandated doctrinal change in 1937. These 
hypothetical arguments place the majority in 2012 at odds with 
the modern world- not in tune with it. Exactly the same thing 
could have happened in 1937, too. 
VII. CONCLUSION: AGAINST INTERNALISM 
Contemporaries thought that Justice Roberts switched for 
political reasons; internalists argue otherwise. But internalists 
also, and subtly, change the question. In fact, mlany internalist 
claims only make sense as responses to a question other than, 
"did Roberts switch for political reasons?" 
One such other question is, "what had to happen, besides 
political pressure, for Justice Roberts to vote as he did in 1937?" 
Another is, "if Roberts did not switch in 1937, would the Court 
have done so later?" Since many of the same factors bear on 
Roberts' switch and on the likelihood of a future change, the 
questions are related. 
Daniel Farber argues, for example, that if President Hoover 
had named conservatives Justices during the 1920's, rather than 
liberals like Brandeis and Stone, the Court would have 
continued invalidating New Deal legislation no matter how 
Roberts voted in 1937. 193 Farber's point enhances our under-
standing- but it does not make it less likely that Roberts 
switched for political reasons. Again, what Farber calls changes 
in the "Zeitgeist" 194 - White, Cushman, and the Casey joint 
opinion use different terms for the same thing-surely 
contribute to a full picture of what happened. But those cultural 
and economic changes in no way mitigate against the conclusion 
that political pressure prompted Roberts to switch in 1937. 
Roberts could not have changed constitutional law without other 
Justices' votes-and their votes would not have been cast for an 
outcome that seemed culturally bizarre- but those things hardly 
means Roberts' switch was non-political. 
The second question-"if Roberts did not switch in 1937, 
would the Court have done so later"- is speculative, but worth 
asking. "Long view" internalism is best regarded as an answer to 
it. But if Roberts did switch for political reasons, a strong 
likelihood that the Court would have done so later-even if we 
193. See Farber, supra note 25, at 9~6-87. 
194. !d. at 985. 
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could son1ehow know that- would not change what Roberts had 
done. In any event, if Roberts had not switched when he did, 
Court-packing might well have been enacted. A packed Court 
surely would have embraced the constitutional doctrines that, 
according to long view internalists, the Supreme Court was 
destined to adopt by economics, epistemology, or History. But as 
noted earlier, judicial review might well have faded away as a 
result. 
Internalism, and the idea of an internalism-externalism 
debate, represent remarkable inventions. Internalism supposes 
that political knowledge in the ordinary sense-what almost 
everyone in 1937 thought they knew- rests on a philosophical 
error. This error is said to arise from legal realism, a philosophy 
inconsistent with the autonomy of law from politics. Thus, those 
who deny and those who accept the obvious are said to be 
engaged in philosophical debate. 
The idea of a debate about legal philosophy understandably 
appeals to internalists. In some ways, it parallels their claim that 
conceptual developments account for constitutional revolution 
of the mid-1930's. It is also true, however, that internalists lose in 
factual debates about the events of 1937. Shesol's book offers 
the latest, and perhaps most compelling, demonstration. 
Beyond that, the very idea of a philosophically driven 
debate is wrong. For one thing, internalists and externalists offer 
the same kinds of arguments about developments- both make 
legal and political claims. And both produce singular historical 
narratives. Nor does anyone rely on the kinds of arguments that 
might transform a historical debate into a philosophical one: that 
is, no one argues that the nature of law determined what 
happened. In the terminology introduced earlier, there are no 
strong internalists or externalists. 
Weak internalists, it is true, do argue that legal realism 
blinds externalists to the truth. But weak internalists are 
mistaken. Since externalists accurately describe events, the 
question of what misled them never arises. Nor does the concept 
of an internalist-externalist debate capture the views actual 
Justices have expressed about 1937 -which is anomalous, since 
internalists supposedly take law seriously. 
Other anomalies, even ironies, surround internalism. 
Internalists ignore or downplay pivotal 1936 Supreme Court 
decisions, like Carter Coal and Butler- but they accuse 
opponents of overlooking the significance of legal doctrine. 
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Defending law's autonomy, internalists argue that legal change is 
predetermined by economics, epistemology, or History- by 
anything, it seems, except electoral politics or other considera-
tions that could detract from the standing of the Supreme Court. 
Internalists claim that a new mode of thinking about the world 
unraveled the pre-1937 fabric of constitutional law. But their 
own historical writing exhibits the very formalism that they claim 
disappeared in the 1930's. Some internalists argue-mistakenly, 
I believe- that the practice of "guardian review" ended with the 
constitutional revolution of 1937. Yet internalism resembles 
nothing so much as "guardian review" in historical guise, 
attempting to defend the boundary between law and politics. 
Philosophical idealists at the turn of the 201h century claimed 
that the world of the senses was illusory, and only ideas were 
real. To show that our senses could not be believed, they often 
cited the example of a straight wooden stick that, when placed in 
water, would appear bent. One day a philosopher brought a 
beaker of water to a philosophy lecture, and it contained a bent-
looking stick. Asked to describe what was before their eyes, 
idealists in the audience said they said that they were seeing a 
straight stick that looked bent because it was in water. The 
philosopher then removed the stick, which was in fact bent. 
Audience members had made a mistake that only idealist 
philosophers would make. 
In many ways, internalists resemble the philosophers in that 
audience. Seeing something right before their eyes, internalists 
claim to see something else-almost positing a world beyond the 
senses. But internalists are worse off than idealists, since they 
cannot cite anything like the laws of refraction to explain why 
appearances might deceive. 
Unlike a stick, of course, the constitutional revolution of 
1937 cannot be removed from a beaker and exhibited before our 
eyes. Shesol, however, comes as close to doing so as anyone can. 
After Supreme Power, an internalist will be like someone who, 
after the bent stick has been removed from water, continues to 
insist that it is straight-or who, like Shesol, describes the bent 
stick accurately but insists that we cannot believe our eyes. 
